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OUTSIDE A BLACK BOX: COURT AND 
REGULATORY REVIEW OF INVESTMENT 
VALUATIONS OF HARD-TO-VALUE SECURITIES 
SALVATORE MASSA* 
ABSTRACT 
Valuation is a critical function of investment advisers that has 
significant implications for both clients and advisers. One poten-
tial risk associated with valuation is that an investment adviser may 
abuse its position in valuing portfolio assets to accrue higher man-
agement and incentive fees to the detriment of clients. Although the 
valuation function may be viewed as an objective exercise, adviser 
valuations become subject to greater levels of discretion for hard-
to-value securities, making determinations of adviser abuse less clear. 
Depending on the transparency of the adviser, the valuation pro-
cess itself may become a black box to the client. Securities and Ex-
change Commission regulation of and enforcement actions over an 
investment adviser’s valuations of securities and court review of pri-
vate litigation have taken different approaches to address this prob-
lem. Although Securities and Exchange Commission matters address 
questions of whether an adviser has appropriately valued a par-
ticular security, the focus of many enforcement matters addresses 
the process an adviser used to reach a valuation determination. In 
contrast, private litigants are constrained by court views of valua-
tions of hard-to-value securities within the context of the antifraud 
statutes. In many cases, courts have taken the position that such 
determinations are simply opinions of an adviser. This Article sur-
veys these approaches and concludes that judicial scrutiny should 
focus on a process-driven approach for adviser valuations. 
                                                                                                                         
* Senior Counsel, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Division 
of Enforcement, Asset Management Unit. LL.M., Georgetown University Law 
Center; J.D., University of Wisconsin. The Securities and Exchange Commission, 
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ment by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author 
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leagues upon the staff of the Commission. The Author expresses his appreciation 
for the insights provided by Douglas Scheidt, Associate Director and Chief Counsel 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most fundamental functions of any manager of an 
investment vehicle is to value the portfolio assets accurately. The 
valuation of the portfolio over time reveals the financial perfor-
mance of the investment and typically determines the fees the 
manager receives. In many instances, the valuation function is 
easy to discern for the manager and easy to verify for the investor 
or advisory client because the portfolio is disclosed and the assets 
have readily verifiable market prices. However, many investment 
strategies incorporate thinly traded bonds, derivative instruments, 
and other securities that do not have transparent market prices. 
Further, private funds may contractually limit investor access to 
portfolio holdings and may provide themselves with wide latitude 
to value the assets.1 In these instances, the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“Commission” or “SEC”) and its staff 
have recognized the potential for abuse on the part of investment 
managers, who have a natural incentive to increase the value of 
portfolio assets in order to reap more handsome fees and tout 
more attractive returns to prospective investors.2 To address these 
                                                                                                                         
1 The term “private fund” is used in the Advisers Act of 1940 and generally 
refers to hedge funds. Hedge funds have grown in prominence as an investment 
vehicle for sophisticated and institutional investors. For a description of the 
origin and general characteristics of hedge funds, see JACK D. SCHWAGER, 
MARKET SENSE AND NONSENSE: HOW THE MARKETS REALLY WORK (AND HOW 
THEY DON’T) 185–210 (2013). 
2 Valuation is “critically important” for all investment companies because, 
among other things, “investment managers who are compensated on the basis 
of net asset value or performance may be unduly compensated.” Statement Re-
garding “Restricted Securities,” Investment Co. Act Release No. 5847, Account-
ing Series Release No. 113, [1937–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 72,135 (Oct. 21, 1969) [hereinafter Statement Regarding “Restricted 
Securities”]. For a discussion of the context of ASR 113, which was focused on 
concerns of valuation practices in mutual funds, see Janet K. Smith, et al., The 
SEC’s “Fair Value” Standard for Mutual Fund Investment in Restricted Shares 
and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 421, 426–28 (2001); 
see also David W. Grim, Deputy Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n, Remarks to the Investment Management Institute 2013 (Mar. 7, 
2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech 
/1365171515032) [https://perma.cc/68LT-TX9W] (prepared by Norm Champ, Dir., 
Div. of Inv. Mgmt.). Besides overpaying the adviser, overvaluation of portfolio 
assets can have dilutive effects on the investors in the fund. In this scenario a 
shareholder that redeems would reap a windfall at the expense of shareholders 
who remained in the fund. Craig S. Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, 1999 WL 
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issues, the federal securities laws and the Commission have adopted 
a process-driven approach to scrutinize valuations of hard-to-
value securities.3 
The federal securities laws have attempted to address the con-
flict of interest inherent in a manager’s valuation of investment 
assets particularly for registered investment companies that are 
subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Com-
pany Act”).4 The statutes and rules of the Investment Company 
Act relating to valuation focus on general standards and proce-
dures for valuation rather than issuing specific valuation guide-
lines for hard-to-value securities.5 Separate from these statutes 
and rules, the Commission has provided guidance to registered 
investment companies in applying the valuation standards in the 
Investment Company Act to hard-to-value securities.6 
In addition, more limited regulation exists for investment advis-
ers registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advis-
ers Act”)7 who manage private funds. The Advisers Act provisions 
take the form of specific requirements that may influence an ad-
viser’s valuation, such as a requirement for annual audited financial 
                                                                                                                         
35020116, 5 n.4 (Dec. 8, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guid 
ance/tyle120899.htm [https://perma.cc/G734-YN7Z] [hereinafter Tyle, SEC In-
terpretive Letter]. 
3 See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2015); 
see also In re Kornitzer Capital Mgmt. Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 
31,560, 2015 WL 1800393 (Apr. 21, 2015); In re Chariot Advisors, LLC, Exchange 
Act Release No. 72,541, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3872, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 31,149, 2014 WL 2986899 at *3 (July 3, 2014). 
4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80-a(1)(b)(5) (2012) (stating “it is declared that the 
national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected ... 
when investment companies ... in computing their earnings and the asset value 
of their outstanding securities, employ unsound or misleading methods, or are 
not subjected to adequate independent scrutiny”). 
5 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41); Rules and Regulations, Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-1-2 (2015); id. § 270.2a-4; Smith et 
al., supra note 2, at 422–23. 
6 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2; see also Ac-
counting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 6295, Accounting Series Release No. 118, 
[1937–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,140 (Dec. 23, 1970) [here-
inafter Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies]. 
7 See Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 1092 (Oct. 8, 1987). 
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statements or a surprise inspection that invariably touches on a 
fund’s valuation.8 In addition to specific requirements, the Advisers 
Act also contains general antifraud provisions, including one that 
focuses on an adviser’s fiduciary obligations to a client.9 Depend-
ing on an adviser’s conduct, these provisions may reach an ad-
viser’s valuation. 
For valuation disputes involving investors of private funds, the 
aggrieved investors are left to rely on the courts’ interpretation of 
the federal securities antifraud statutes.10 While these provisions 
are well suited to address situations of overtly fraudulent conduct, 
such as Ponzi schemes, they often fail to extend to situations when 
advisers utilize problematic valuation methodologies.11 Courts have 
been reticent to extend antifraud concepts to an investment man-
ager’s valuation, setting significant barriers for plaintiffs to prevail, 
particularly for private fund investors in these situations.12 Courts 
have treated valuations largely as opinions rather than state-
ments of fact.13 The implication of these cases is that a manager’s 
valuation—while completely inaccurate—may remain impervious 
to legal scrutiny. In many respects, the court’s treatment of the 
subject is better understood as an extension of the business judg-
ment rule and the dilemma of having courts interject their views 
of value in a potentially complicated situation.14 Despite these 
challenges, a better approach could be developed to afford courts 
a process-driven review of an adviser’s valuation procedures that 
is more aligned with the Commission’s approach. 
                                                                                                                         
8 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (clarifying that audit and surprise inspection 
provisions extend to advisers who maintain custody of the securities); see also 
id. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(2) (stating that custody is interpreted broadly to include 
“having any authority to obtain possession” of client funds or securities).  
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012). 
10 Private litigants often rely on the antifraud provisions in the Securities 
Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Ex-
change Act”), particularly Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q–r, 
§ 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
11 See, e.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 108–11 (2d Cir. 2011); 
In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 311–12 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 679 F.3d 64, 67–69 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
12 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 
LA. L. REV. 381, 381–94 (2013).  
13 Id. 
14 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doc-
trine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87–90 (2004). 
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This Article explores the regulatory and legal framework for 
fund valuations of securities and concludes that the current ap-
proach inadequately protects investors. In Section I of this Article, 
I discuss the Investment Company Act and Advisers Act provi-
sions that govern valuation, particularly as it relates to the con-
cept of fair value. This section also surveys settled administrative 
proceedings brought by the Commission involving valuation re-
lated claims against registered funds. Section II provides a survey 
of case law addressing valuation issues with a focus on private 
funds. In Section III, I discuss the limitations of the current ap-
proach in the case law and suggest possible alternatives for ad-
dressing valuation disputes. 
I. THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND ADVISERS ACT 
The legal framework for valuation issues in the federal secu-
rities laws is primarily in the Investment Company Act and the 
Advisers Act.15 The Investment Company Act’s provisions are de-
signed to provide specific guidance to the valuation of registered 
funds’ assets when those securities are easy to value.16 A fund 
with a security that has a readily available market price must 
adopt that price in its valuation.17 The Investment Company Act 
further dictates the timing of market quotations of a registered 
investment company’s securities that assures that the valuation 
                                                                                                                         
15 Other statutes, rules, and regulations sometimes become relevant to the 
valuation of assets in investment vehicles. For example, a public holding com-
pany that controls an investment adviser may have reporting and other obli-
gations under the Exchange Act. See, e.g., In re GLG Partners, Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 71050, 107 SEC Docket 4573, 4574 (Dec. 12, 2013) (settled matter) 
(finding adviser’s overvaluation of assets in an investment portfolio also dis-
torted filings of parent, a public company, leading to violations of Sections 
13(b)(2)(B) and 13(b)(1)(A) and Rules 13a-1, a-11, and a-13 of the Exchange 
Act); In re KCAP Fin., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 68,307, 105 SEC Docket 
207, 207–08 (Nov. 28, 2012) (settled matter) (holding that a business develop-
ment company failed to follow relevant accounting rules in valuation of assets 
violating Exchange Act provisions); see also Complaint at 1–6, SEC v. Brantley 
Cap. Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-01906 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2009), [https://perma 
.cc/YCT5-PLH6]; SEC v. Brantley Cap. Mgmt., LLC, Litig. Release No. 21,178, 
96 SEC Docket 1823, 1824 (Aug. 13, 2009) (describing settlement with listed 
business development company whose adviser affiliate misvalued portfolio as-
sets, violating Exchange Act provisions). 
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(41) (2012). 
17 Id. 
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of the underlying securities held by the registered investment 
company is timely.18 However, for hard-to-value securities, the 
Investment Company Act relies on broader principles. The fund’s 
board is charged with a good faith obligation to value such assets 
and to develop policies and procedures for such valuations. 19 
Other provisions of the Investment Company Act require the in-
vestment company to disclose its valuation practices.20 Securities 
enforcement matters against registered funds involving hard-to-
value securities have tended to focus on situations where an abuse 
of the fund’s stated valuation policies and procedures occurred.21 
While more technical violations of the Investment Company Act 
are sometimes implicated in these cases, they typically involve 
some aspect of fraud, either on the part of the adviser’s employees 
or, less frequently, the board itself.22 
The Advisers Act’s provisions have varying applications. The 
antifraud provisions in the Advisers Act, for example, apply to all 
investment advisers, regardless of whether they are registered.23 
For registered advisers, all of the Advisers Act provisions reach 
advisers to both registered investment companies and private 
funds.24 These provisions do not specifically touch the issue of as-
set valuation. However, various provisions, such as the antifraud 
provisions, prohibit advisers from making misleading statements 
                                                                                                                         
18 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2015) (stating Rule 22c-1 of the Investment 
Company Act requires a minimum daily valuation). 
19 See Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 3–5. 
20 See Craig S. Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 436249 (Apr. 30, 2001), 
[https://perma.cc/V5AP-64KA] [hereinafter Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter]. 
21 See In re UBS Global Asset Mgmt. (Americas), Inc., Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 3356, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,920, 102 SEC 
Docket 3075, 3078 (Jan. 17, 2012); see also In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 
Securities Act Release No. 9116, Exchange Act Release No. 61,856, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3009, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,203, 
98 SEC Docket 455, 456 (Apr. 7, 2010).  
22 See supra note 21.  
23 See supra note 7; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1-2), (4) (2012); 17 U.S.C. 
275.206(4)-8 (2012) (Sections 206(1-2), (4), and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Advisers 
Act). Other antifraud provision rules promulgated under Section 206(4) apply 
only to registered advisers. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(4)-1, -2 (2012) (note 
that none of these provisions, including Rule 206(4)-1 and Rule 206(4)-2, are 
available to private litigants). 
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (clarifying that the investment adviser defi-
nition includes advisers to companies and private funds). 
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concerning a fund’s asset valuation.25 Other provisions set mini-
mum disclosure standards for private funds that influence valua-
tions in the fund’s portfolio. For example, the custody rule may 
require private funds to issue audited financial statements if cer-
tain conditions are met.26 However, the Advisers Act provides no 
explicit obligations regarding valuation or the process utilized to 
value any securities in the portfolio.27 As a result, enforcement 
actions against private funds under the Advisers Act have focused 
invariably on fraudulent conduct, such as an adviser’s affirmative 
knowledge that a fund’s assets were intentionally mispriced.28 
A. The Investment Company Act and Fair Value 
1. Statutory Framework and Guidance 
The Investment Company Act ultimately places responsibility 
for valuation determinations on the board of directors of the fund. 
The board is required to develop policies and procedures that com-
ply with the Investment Company Act’s valuation provisions.29 
The primary provision governing valuation requires that, for a se-
curity with “readily available” market quotations, the fund is gen-
erally obligated to utilize the market quotation to value the 
security. 30  Alternatively, for “other securities and assets,” the 
                                                                                                                         
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7. 
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2015) (Section 
206(4) and Rule 206(4)-2 of the Advisers Act). 
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)(D) (While this section of the Advisers Act re-
quires that an investment adviser maintain valuation policies and practices of 
the fund, it does not specify what those policies and procedures should be); see 
also 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(2). 
28 See, e.g., In re John Thomas Cap. Mgmt. Gr. LLC, Securities Act Release 
No. 9396, Exchange Act Release No. 69,208, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 3571, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,435, 105 SEC Docket 4051, 
4051–55 (Mar. 22, 2013); Advisers Act Release No. 3571, 2013 WL 1180836 
(Order Instituting Proceedings, filed Mar. 22, 2013) (partially settled matter, 
litigation ongoing). 
29 See Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 3–5. 
30 Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment Company Act provides one excep-
tion to utilizing market prices to value portfolio assets. Money market funds 
may deviate from this requirement and instead use amortized cost under cer-
tain circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(41)(B). However, under Rule 2a-7, the 
Commission will scrutinize the use of fair value pricing if it is used to prop up 
or otherwise manipulate asset values. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7; see also In re John 
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fund’s board of directors determines “fair value” in “good faith.”31 
Although the Investment Company Act appears to create two cat-
egories of securities relevant to valuation analysis, a fund’s obli-
gation to utilize fair value may include securities that typically 
have readily available quotations. For example, fair value may be 
appropriate for a widely traded foreign security if the foreign ex-
change on which it is traded is closed because of a scheduled mar-
ket holiday and a value is needed for that date.32 In addition, the 
fair value approach is often necessary for alternative mutual funds 
that hold hard-to-value securities.33 
                                                                                                                         
E. Backlund, et. al, Securities Act Release No. 7626, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 1783, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,639, 68 SEC 
Docket 2663, 2665 (Jan. 11, 1999). 
Additional provisions in the Investment Company Act touch on valuation 
considerations relevant to the valuation of the fund’s shares. Rule 2a-4(a)(2) 
requires open-end mutual funds to reflect changes in its portfolio holdings no 
later than in the first calculation one business day following the trade date. 17 
C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(2). Rule 2a-4(a) defines “current net asset value” for shares 
issued by an open-end mutual fund. Id. § 270.2a-4(a). Rule 22c-1(a) states that 
a computation of the valuation of open-end mutual fund shares must be com-
puted to reflect current net asset value after the receipt of a purchase or sale 
order. Id. § 270.22c-1(a). Rule 22c-1(b) specifies that an open-end mutual fund’s net 
asset value must be calculated at least daily. Id. § 270.22c-1(b). Under § 23(b), 
closed-end mutual funds are not permitted to issue stock at prices below net 
asset value. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(b). 
31 See the definition of “Value” under Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment 
Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(41)(B). 
32 See MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS FORUM, REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND DI-
RECTORS FORUM: PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR FUND DIRECTORS ON VALUATION 
OVERSIGHT 3 (2012), http://www.mfdf.org/images/Newsroom/Valuation-web.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5BGF-TD3T] (providing the example described, as well as 
other situations when an exchange-traded security might require fair value 
treatment). 
33 Until recently, the alternative mutual fund space was the fastest growing 
area in asset management. See Deidre Brennan, Will Liquid Alts’ Performance 
Sustain Future Asset Flows?, FINALTERNATIVES 1 (Aug. 25, 2014) http://www 
.finalternatives.com/node/28088/print [http://perma.cc/7RYB-C9LW] (noting 
that although the segment made up 1 percent of the mutual fund industry (ap-
proximately $154 billion in assets under management), the segment grew by 
43 percent in 2013). However, growth in the space has slowed considerably, 
and a growing number of funds have liquidated. See Joe Morris, Liquidations 
Signal Turning Point for Alts, IGNITES (Dec. 31, 2015). For valuation consider-
ations related to these funds, see Norm Champ, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Re-
marks to the Practising Law Institute, Private Equity Forum, (June 30, 2014), 
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The Commission provided guidance on the fair value and good 
faith concepts as they related to illiquid and hard-to-value securities 
over forty years ago in two releases.34 The first release, issued in 
1969, discussed situations when a fund board’s approval of a valua-
tion technique would fall short of good faith.35 For example, in dis-
cussing the valuation of restricted securities,36 the Commission 
stated that it was improper to fix the valuation at the market price 
or at a preset percentage discount from free trading securities of the 
same issuer, cost, or an amortization formula for various reasons.37 
The theme of the Commission’s 1969 release was that there is “no 
automatic formula” to apply to such securities and that fund boards 
were obliged to continuously review restricted stocks “individually.”38 
One year later, the Commission issued additional guidance. 
The 1970 release emphasized that there was no single standard 
for determining which “fair value ... in good faith can be laid down 
since fair value depends on the circumstances of each individual 
case.”39 The Commission defined fair value as a value based on 
“the amount which the owner might reasonably expect to receive 
for them upon their current sale.”40 Rather than setting out a 
methodology for determining fair value in good faith, the 1970 re-
lease provides a number of relevant factors a fund board may con-
sider in conducting a good faith valuation. Although not purporting 
                                                                                                                         
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13705 
42253660) [http://perma.cc/S84V-X25J]. 
34 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2, ¶ 72,135; 
see also Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Com-
panies, supra note 6, ¶ 72,140. 
35 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2, ¶ 72,135. 
36 A party holding restricted stock is subject to limits on how or when the shares 
can be disposed. For example, Rule 144 of the Securities Act places a holding 
period and other restrictions on certain stock. Such stock is typically viewed as 
worth less than free trading stock in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., John D. 
Finnerty, The Impact of Stock Transfer Restrictions on the Private Placement 
Discount, 42 FIN. MGMT. 575, 575–609 (2013); Daniel R. Van Vleet & Frank D. 
Gerber, Valuing Restricted Stocks Issued in Acquisitions, 35 MERGERS & AC-
QUISITIONS 36, 36–39 (2000). 
37 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2, ¶ 72,135. 
38 Id. at 5. 
39 See Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Com-
panies, supra note 6, ¶ 72,140. 
40 Id. Some commenters have criticized fixing fair value on a current sale 
price because investors and the adviser may view the security on the basis of 
a future anticipated return. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 2, at 426. 
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to be exhaustive, the factors for equity securities include funda-
mental analytical data relating to the investment, analyst reports, 
size of the holding, recent transactions, merger proposals or tender 
offers, and equities trading activity in comparable enterprises.41 
Commission staff has periodically reiterated the Commission’s 
guidance over a board’s good faith obligation in making a fair 
value determination.42 In the recent money market fund reforms 
implemented by the Commission in 2014, the Commission provided 
added guidance concerning the use of pricing services to obtain 
valuations of hard-to-value securities.43 Although the use of such 
services is permissible, the board “may want to consider the inputs, 
methods, models, and assumptions used by the pricing service to 
determine its evaluated prices, and how those inputs, methods, 
models, and assumptions are affected (if at all) as market condi-
tions change” before relying on those valuations.44 The Commis-
sion outlined other considerations, such as “the quality of the 
evaluated prices provided by the service” and the proximity of 
time of the valuations to the time the fund calculates a net asset 
value.45 The guidance also questioned “the appropriateness of us-
ing evaluated prices provided by pricing services as the fair val-
ues of the fund’s portfolio securities” if “the fund’s board of 
directors does not have a good faith basis for believing that the 
pricing service’s pricing methodologies produce evaluated prices 
that reflect what the fund could reasonably expect to obtain for the 
securities in a current sale under current market conditions.”46 
                                                                                                                         
41 See Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Com-
panies, supra note 6, ¶ 72,140. 
42 See, e.g., Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 7; Tyle, SEC No-
Action Letter, supra note 20, at 8. (While noting that there is “no single standard” 
for determining fair value in good faith, “a board acts in good faith when its 
fair value determination is the result of a sincere and honest assessment of the 
amount that the fund might reasonably expect to receive for a security upon 
its current sale, based upon all of the appropriate factors that are available to 
the fund.”). The Commission has also recently reiterated many of these basic 
principles in discussing its reforms to money market funds. See Money Market 
Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,814 (Aug. 14, 2014) 
[hereinafter Money Market Reform]. The Commission was explicit that its dis-
cussion of valuation covered all registered investment companies. See id. at 
47,812, n.873. 
43 See Money Market Reform, supra note 42, at 47,813. 
44 Id. at 47,814. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 47,815. 
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U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“U.S. GAAP”), 
which are often used by U.S. firms, provide further guidance on fair 
value, but do not formally distinguish between the two categories 
valuation set out in the Investment Company Act.47 Instead, all 
securities are valued as “fair value” which is defined as an “exit 
price”—a “price at which an orderly transaction to sell the asset 
or to transfer the liability would take place between market par-
ticipants at the measurement date under current market condi-
tions.”48 U.S. GAAP identifies two general categories of possible 
inputs that may be relevant to valuing an asset. The first cate-
gory, observable inputs, relies on existing market data that may 
be relevant to valuing the asset.49 There is a further distinction 
in the treatment of observable inputs.50 Publicly traded securities 
with large trading volumes often have market quotations that are 
an observable input.51 U.S. GAAP treats a valuation that is de-
rived from such unadjusted market quotations of the same asset 
as a Level 1 input.52 For securities lacking market transactions, 
market prices for similar assets are an example of an observable 
                                                                                                                         
47 Although not explored in this Article, accountants also face liability con-
cerning the audit of a fund’s financial statements. Potential liability extends 
to an accountant’s failure to follow proper accounting principles in the valuation 
of a security. The consequences for accountants who fail to follow applicable 
accounting guidance includes being barred from practicing before the Commis-
sion. See, e.g., In re Lawrence A. Stoler, Securities Act Release No. 8726, Ex-
change Act Release No. 54,246, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2539, 88 
SEC Docket 1647, 1652 (July 31, 2006) (settled matter). 
48 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE: 
FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT (TOPIC 820) 820-10-05-1B (May 2011), https://asc 
.fasb.org/imageRoot/00/7534500.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q587-SSGT] [hereinafter 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS]. International Financial Reporting 
Standards (“IFRS”), which is utilized by many funds domiciled in foreign juris-
dictions, has a similar definition for fair value. See IFRS FOUNDATION, ILLUS-
TRATIVE EXAMPLES TO ACCOMPANY IFRS 13 FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT 6 (Dec. 
2012), http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/education/fvm/documents/educa 
tionfairvaluemeasurement.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JXH-ZFHC]. However, the two 
accounting regimes have varying approaches to the measurement of fair value. 
See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra at 7–8. 
49  See KPMG, FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 36 
(Nov. 2013), http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPubli 
cations/IFRS-Practice-Issues/Documents/fair-value-qa.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV 
Z4-B9AW]. 
50 See, e.g., id. at 3. 
51 Id. at 107. 
52 Id. at 36.  
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input.53 U.S. GAAP treats the use of market quotations of similar 
assets as a Level 2 input.54 
Unobservable inputs—the second category—reflects the use of 
assumptions that market participants may use to value the asset.55 
However, U.S. GAAP requires these assumptions be based on the 
best information available.56 U.S. GAAP describes this form of 
valuation as a Level 3 input.57 Because of the inherent subjectivity 
of unobservable inputs, observable inputs are preferred when 
they are available.58 However, they may not be available for many 
types of assets, including distressed debt, bespoke derivatives, or 
private equity investments.59 
Boards may delegate aspects of the valuation function to other 
parties. Funds often retain third party valuation services to value 
fund securities and may designate a valuation committee that 
consists primarily of non-board members to oversee the valuation 
functions of the fund.60 Although the Commission allows these 
forms of delegation, the ultimate responsibility for fund valuations 
falls on the board.61 
                                                                                                                         
53 Id. at 43–44. 
54 Id. at 5.  
55 Id. at 22. 
56 Id. at 23. 
57 Id. at 36. 
58 Id. at 46. 
59  See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS FINANCIAL SERVICES, STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 157—FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS 3, 
http://www.pwc.com/bm/en/publication/assets/usgaap_08_04.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/U5EP-7CZC]. 
60 MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR FUND DIRECTORS 
ON VALUATION OVERSIGHT 10 (2012), http://www.mfdf.org/images/Newsroom 
/Valuation-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/HED4-8A85]. 
61 The Commission has repeatedly emphasized that boards cannot delegate 
the ultimate responsibility for determining the fair value of fund assets. For 
example, the Commission has stated: 
[I]t is incumbent upon the Board of Directors to satisfy themselves 
that all appropriate factors relevant to the value of securities for 
which market quotations are not readily available have been 
considered and to determine the method of arriving at the fair 
value of each such security. To the extent considered necessary, 
the board may appoint persons to assist them in the determi-
nation of such value, and to make the actual calculations pur-
suant to the board’s direction. The board must also, consistent 
with this responsibility, continuously review the appropriateness 
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The board’s obligations regarding valuation under the Invest-
ment Company Act are process-driven and relate to the develop-
ment of sound valuation policies and procedures rather than a fund’s 
estimate of value to any particular security. For example, Rule 
38a-1 of the Investment Company Act requires each registered 
fund to “[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to prevent violation of the Federal Securities 
Laws by the fund.”62 It is incumbent on the board to develop val-
uation policies and procedures that: (a) monitor the necessity of 
using fair value prices and develop criteria to determine when 
market quotations are not an appropriate value; (b) implement a 
methodology to fair value assets in the fund; and (c) regularly re-
view the valuation methodology of the fund and implement ad-
justments as needed.63 Fund boards are also required to review 
the adequacy of the policies and procedures of service providers, 
such as the adviser to the fund, principal underwriter, adminis-
trators and transfer agents.64 
The threshold issue a board confronts is whether a market quota-
tion is not an appropriate measure of the value of the security held 
in the fund’s portfolio.65 Commission staff has explicitly stated that 
boards should “carefully consider various indications of the valid-
ity and reliability of market quotations” for domestic securities.66 
                                                                                                                         
of the method used in valuing each issue of security in the com-
pany’s portfolio. The directors must recognize their responsibilities 
in this matter and whenever technical assistance is requested 
from individuals who are not directors, the findings of such in-
dividuals must be carefully reviewed by the directors in order 
to satisfy themselves that the resulting valuations are fair. 
Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, 
supra note 6, ¶ 72,140; see also In re Seaboard Assoc., Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 20,867, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,890, 30 SEC Docket 
330, 334–35 (Apr. 16, 1984) (Commission Section 21(a) Report); In re Hammes, 
et. al, Securities Act Release No. 8346, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,290, 81 SEC Docket 2467, 2472 (Dec. 11, 2003) (settled matter) (quoting In re 
Hartl & Lipman, Securities Act Release No. 7031, Exchange Act 33,165, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 19,840, 55 SEC Docket 991, 994-94 (Nov. 8, 
1993)); Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter supra note 20, at 8 n.23. 
62  Rules and Regulations, Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.38a-1(2006) [hereinafter Rules and Regulations, Act of 1940]. 
63 Compliance Programs of Inv. Co. and Inv. Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 
74,718 (Dec. 24, 2003) (codified as 17 C.F.R. §§ 270, 275, 279). 
64 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
65 See KPMG, supra note 49, at 39.  
66 Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 20, at 3. 
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A thin market for a security or widely varying quotations from 
broker-dealers might be indicative of the need for fair value pric-
ing. Funds, often with the assistance of third party pricing services, 
identify triggering events that support using fair value pricing.67 
Once such an event occurs, the fund’s board exercises its judgment 
to determine whether using fair value is appropriate.68 The board 
would then likely retain a third party to conduct the valuation.69 
As noted, a fund’s board is required to adopt policies and proce-
dures with respect to valuation.70 Fair value is likely a significant 
aspect of these policies and procedures, which should include a 
description of the methodology for a fair value determination.71 
The adviser to the fund, who is responsible for managing the port-
folio, will follow the methodology outlined in the procedures. The 
methodology should contain a hierarchy of the source for a fair value 
determination.72 The appropriate valuation source may be varied 
based on the type of security to be valued.73 When implemented 
properly, the procedures should demonstrate that the adviser is 
consistently using fair value procedures across the fund’s portfolio.74 
A fund board’s responsibility does not end with a one-time adop-
tion of valuation policies and procedures—Commission staff has 
stated that the board should “periodically review the appropriate-
ness of the methods used to fair value price portfolio securities 
and the quality of the prices obtained through these procedures, 
and ... make changes when appropriate.”75 One aspect of this re-
sponsibility—monitoring—requires the board to determine what 
                                                                                                                         
67 MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, supra note 60, at 5. Funds often set a trigger 
that is “a percentage of the daily change in the value of an index of domestic 
securities between the time of the close of a foreign exchange and the close of 
the NYSE.” Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 See 68 Fed. Reg. 74,718. 
71 Id. 
72 See MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, supra note 60, at 5.  
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 7. An older Commis-
sion 21(a) Report used stronger language, emphasizing the board’s continuous 
review of valuation methods: 
While the Commission recognizes the difficulties inherent in 
the valuation of [such] interests, directors have an affirmative 
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documentation is necessary to evaluate whether the investment 
adviser is following the fund’s valuation policies and procedures.76 
The Mutual Fund Directors Forum has outlined common board 
best practices to address valuation issues.77 Boards sometimes 
appoint a member to act as a liaison to communicate with the val-
uation committee or other relevant parties on difficult valuation is-
sues.78 During the monitoring process, the board may become ap-
prised that a particular valuation policy or procedure is no longer 
appropriate for a variety of reasons and, therefore may wish to con-
sider revising its policies and procedures. Boards may also adopt 
a more formalized approach, periodically conducting a review of all 
valuation policies and procedures and obtaining the input of other 
relevant parties—counsel, auditors, and other valuation experts.79 
The review process sometimes also incorporates a risk-based anal-
ysis to determine the robustness of the fund’s valuation policies 
and procedures under different scenarios.80 
Although less relevant to the valuation process itself, the In-
vestment Company Act also regulates the liquidity of open-end 
mutual funds.81 The liquidity regulations, however, may have the 
effect of reducing the amount of hard-to-value securities present 
                                                                                                                         
responsibility to keep informed of developments which materi-
ally affect those assets not having a readily ascertainable mar-
ket value .... Consistent with this responsibility, the directors 
of a registered investment company must continuously review 
the appropriateness of the method used in valuing the asset 
not having a readily ascertainable market value. 
In re Seaboard Assoc., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 20,867, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 13,890, 30 SEC Docket 330, 334–35 (Apr. 16, 1984). 
76 Board monitoring of adviser valuations as well as maintaining adequate 
documentation to support that oversight are derived from Rule 38a-1(a)(3) and 
(d) of the Investment Company Act. See Rules and Regulations, Act of 1940, 
supra note 62. Commission guidance has suggested continuous review of the 
valuation policies. See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra 
note 2, ¶ 72,135. Further, the 1970 release notes that the information a board 
considered in reaching a fair valuation determination “should be documented 
in the minutes of the directors’ meeting and the supporting data retained for 
the inspection of the company’s independent accountant.” Id. 
77 See MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, supra note 60, at 2. 
78 See id. at 6. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 6–8. 
81 See generally Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (2012). 
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in certain registered investment companies. For example, the In-
vestment Company Act requires that such funds satisfy redemp-
tion requests within seven days of the request.82 Commission staff 
have provided related guidance that open-end funds should not 
hold more that 15 percent of the net assets in illiquid securities.83 
And, the guidance defines an illiquid security as one that cannot 
be disposed of in the ordinary course of business within seven 
days at approximately the value of which the fund has valued the 
investment on its books.84 Therefore, an important consideration 
in assigning a value of a portfolio security is whether the open-end 
fund can dispose of that asset within the seven-day timeframe.85 
An analog concept that appears throughout the securities laws—
the concept of disclosure—is also relevant to fund valuations and 
consistent with the process-driven approach toward valuation is-
sues.86 The Investment Company Act requires fund transparency 
of valuation policies in periodic filings.87 For example, open-end 
mutual funds are required to file registration statements that in-
clude disclosures regarding the methodology to value securities in 
the fund’s portfolio, the circumstances under which a fund may 
use fair value rather than market quotations, and the effect on 
the fund of using market quotations.88 There are similar require-
ments to disclose “the methods used in determining value of in-
vestments” of a fund in periodic financial statements.89 Failure to 
accurately value the securities or follow a fund’s stated valuation 
procedures can lead to violations of Section 34(b) of the Investment 
                                                                                                                         
82 Id. § 80a-22(e). 
83 See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828 (Mar. 20, 
1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 274). Some authors had historically 
suggested that registered funds did not fully take advantage of holding illiquid 
securities up to the 15 percent limit because of onerous fair value requirements. 
See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 460–61. However, the growth of registered 
funds pursuing liquid alternative strategies may undermine such a critique. 
See Brennan, supra note 33. 
84 See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, 57 Fed. Reg. at 9829. 
85 Id. 
86 See generally Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2012). 
87 17 C.F.R. § 271.11A (1984). 
88 Id. § 8(b). One disadvantage of these filings, however, is the possibility that 
they may become stale if the board changes the fund’s valuation methodology. 
89 See Special rules of general application to registered investment compa-
nies, 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-03(d) (1994). 
18 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:001 
Company Act that prohibits funds from disclosing materially mis-
leading information in any required Commission filing.90 
2. Commission Enforcement Actions 
Commission enforcement actions involving registered funds 
for valuation issues unsurprisingly tend to focus on failures and 
abuses of the fund’s valuation policies and procedures. These mat-
ters typically involve situations where the fund failed to follow its 
stated valuation procedures.91 They largely occur in situations where 
a fund’s portfolio is losing value and a portfolio manager attempts 
to manipulate the fund’s valuation procedures to hide the losses.92 
In many of these cases, the Commission does not charge the fund’s 
board since it was deceived.93 
                                                                                                                         
90 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2012).  
91 See, e.g., In re Equinox Fund Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,004, 
Exchange Act Release No. 76,927, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4315, 
2016 WL 212680 (Jan. 19, 2016) (settled matter); In re UBS Global Asset Mgmt. 
(Ams.) Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3356, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 29,920, 102 SEC Docket 3075, 3076–78 (Jan. 17 2012) (settled 
matter); In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., et al., Securities Act Release No. 9116, 
Exchange Act Release No. 61,856, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3009, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 29,203, 98 SEC Docket 455, 456 (Apr. 7, 
2010) (settled matter); In re Piper Cap. Mgmt., Inc., et al., Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8276, Exchange Act Release No. 48,409, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2163, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,167, 80 SEC 
Docket 2772, 2779, 2781 (Aug. 26, 2003) (settled matter); In re Kyle R. Kirk-
land, Securities Act Release No. 8019, Exchange Act Release No. 44,876, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 1982, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 25,199, 75 SEC Docket 2242 (Sept. 28, 2001) (settled matter). 
92 However, there are situations where an adviser may undervalue a portfolio. 
For example, in Van Wagoner, a portfolio manager of a fund complex under-
valued illiquid securities holdings. See In re Van Wagoner, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2281, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,579, 83 SEC 
Docket 1955, 1957 (Aug. 26, 2004) (settled matter). The funds’ offering materials 
disclosed that the funds would not acquire illiquid securities if the acquisition 
raised any fund’s holdings of illiquid securities above 15 percent of the value of the 
relevant fund. Id. In the settled matter, the Commission alleged that the port-
folio manager wrote down the value of certain private securities holdings to 
zero in order to acquire more private securities. Id. Although the offering ma-
terials stated that the funds would determine the fair value of such securities, 
the portfolio manager failed to do so. Id. at 1959–60. The order stated that the 
portfolio manager “failed to fair value the securities in good faith ... [and] failed to 
follow the board’s fair valuation policies, which did not permit the write-down in 
securities’ valuations in an effort to shrink the entire portfolio.” Id. 
93 Id. at 1955, 1959, 1961.  
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The Morgan Asset Management,94 administrative proceeding 
and related J. Kenneth Alderman95 proceeding represent recent mat-
ters that address the adviser’s role in accurately valuing hard-to-
value securities and the board’s role in setting appropriate policies 
and procedures related to the valuation process. In Morgan Asset 
Management, the Commission, focusing on a fund’s adviser, al-
leged that the adviser’s staff intentionally inflated the value of 
certain illiquid securities in five funds.96 The assets were sub-
prime mortgage-backed bonds.97 The effect of the mispricing was 
to understate the significant price declines those securities expe-
rienced and understate portfolio losses in the funds.98 In addition 
to charging various violations of the antifraud statutes,99 the order 
charged the respondents with failing to implement adequate poli-
cies and procedures related to valuation practices and for failing 
to comply with the requirements in Rule 22c-1 of the Investment 
Company Act, which requires funds to sell and redeem shares based 
on current net asset values.100 
The funds’ boards of directors delegated the valuation function 
to the adviser, Morgan Asset Management, Inc. (“Morgan Asset”).101 
Morgan Asset priced each portfolio’s securities, calculated a daily 
net asset value for the fund and largely staffed the funds’ valua-
tion committees.102 The funds’ prospectus detailed the valuation 
                                                                                                                         
94 See In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., 98 SEC Docket at 456 (Apr. 7, 2010). The 
matter subsequently settled. See In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., Exchange 
Act Release No. 64,720, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3218, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 29,704, 2011 WL 2482883 (June 22, 2011). 
95 See In re J. Kenneth Alderman, et al., Investment Company Act Release 
No. 30,557, 106 SEC Docket 2376 (June 13, 2013) (settled matter). 
96 See In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., 98 SEC Docket at 456, 459. 
97 Id. at 456.  
98 Id. at 456, 458. 
99 The order cited violations of the general antifraud provisions in Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Ex-
change Act of 1934, and the advisory antifraud statutes of Sections 206(1) and 
206(2) of the Advisers Act of 1940. Id. at 459. In addition, the order cited vio-
lations of Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which prohib-
its misleading statements in certain filings. Id.  
100 The order charged violations of policies and procedures provisions in 
both the Investment Company Act (Rule 38a-1) and the Advisers Act under 
Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-7. See id. at 459–60. 
101 Id. at 456. 
102 Id. at 456–57. 
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process when market quotations were not available.103 In those 
situations, fair value was determined through various factors in-
cluding the use of “fundamental analytical data,” “an evaluation 
of the forces which influence the market in which the securities are 
purchased or sold,” and “events affecting the security.”104 The poli-
cies and procedures also required the funds’ valuation committees 
to maintain documentation of the manner fair value was determined 
for a security.105 In addition, to support the fair value, each commit-
tee was required to maintain the next reliable quote for the fair 
valued security.106 
The Commission alleged that Morgan Asset failed to comply 
with the funds’ valuation policies and procedures in several re-
spects. First, the funds’ valuation committees “left pricing deci-
sions to lower level employees ... who did not have the training or 
qualifications to make fair value pricing determinations.” 107  The 
Commission also alleged that the valuation committees failed to re-
view fair valuations of securities periodically, allowing them to be 
carried in the portfolio at “stale values for many months at a 
time.”108 The Commission’s main allegations revolved around the 
activities of a portfolio manager of the funds. The manager provided 
262 “price adjustments” to illiquid mortgage-backed securities that 
were unsubstantiated and he was given too much discretion to se-
lect which broker-dealer quotes would be used to substantiate the 
valuations or whether they were overridden entirely.109 
The portfolio manager’s conduct was particularly egregious in 
Morgan Asset. The Commission alleged that he had conversations 
with one broker-dealer employee that was providing indicative 
quotes for the illiquid securities to the funds’ auditor and Morgan 
Asset’s accounting department. 110  The portfolio manager re-
quested the employee increase the broker-dealer’s quotes as an 
accommodation to avoid having to mark down the fair value of the 
securities that the manager had assigned.111 For example, the 
                                                                                                                         
103 Id. at 457. 
104 Id. at 456. 
105 Id. 
106 See id.  
107 Id. at 457. 
108 Id. at 457–58.  
109 Id. at 457. 
110 Id. at 456, 458.  
111 Id. at 458. 
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portfolio manager had marked down a mortgage-backed security 
from $78 to $72.112 A few days later, the broker-dealer’s trading 
desk provided a value of the same security at $50.113 However, the 
portfolio manager persuaded the broker-dealer employee to pro-
vide an “interim” quote of $65, substantially overstating the value 
of the security.114 In other instances, the portfolio manager also 
persuaded the broker-dealer not to provide the funds’ auditor and 
Morgan Asset’s accounting department a quotation.115 
In Alderman, which named eight directors as respondents, fo-
cused on the board’s role in setting appropriate policies and pro-
cedures to value portfolio securities for the funds Morgan Asset 
advised.116 The settled action simply alleged a violation of Rule 
38a-1 of the Investment Company Act.117 The Morgan Asset fund 
complex invested heavily in below investment grade debt securi-
ties that required fair value pricing.118 In practice, the accounting 
department of the adviser set fair values based on a sample of 
indicative quotes from brokers.119 As these assets experienced an 
abrupt decline in value, the portfolio manager overrode the valu-
ations and smoothed the losses.120 For example, the portfolio man-
ager “gradually reduce[d], over days or weeks, a bond to its current 
proper valuation.”121 As discussed previously, Morgan Asset’s con-
duct violated the policies and procedures in place for the funds.122 
Although the fund complex had policies and procedures in 
place, which cited commonly accepted factors to fair value securi-
ties, the administrative order alleged that they were inadequate 
and created the conditions that permitted the flawed security val-
ues.123 The policies and procedures did not provide a “meaningful 
                                                                                                                         
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 See In re Alderman, et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 30,557, 
106 SEC Docket 2376, 3280–81 (June 13, 2013). 
117 Id. at 2381.  
118 Id. at 2376–77. 
119 The administrative order emphasizes that the broker quotes were not 
firm quotes—in other words, quotes of prices at which the broker would actu-
ally buy the securities rather than opinions of value. Id. at 2378. 
120 Id. at 2378–79.  
121 Id. at 2379. 
122 See supra notes 107–15 and accompanying text. 
123 Alderman, 106 SEC Docket at 2378. 
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methodology or other specific direction on how to make fair value 
determinations for specific portfolio assets or classes of assets.”124 
In particular, the policies and procedures lacked guidance on how 
to weigh each valuation factor.125 The policies and procedures also 
failed to define critical terms in their valuation guidance, such as 
what constitutes “fundamental analytical data” for valuation pur-
poses, and there was no mechanism to further review potentially 
stale fair values.126 Additionally, no directors were members of the 
valuation committee, and the guidelines did not require the commit-
tee to report to the board the valuation methodology used to fair 
value the securities.127 The order highlighted the board’s obliga-
tion to set such policies and procedures in situations where the 
board does not directly make valuations itself: 
In connection with determining fair values, the Directors did not 
calculate the valuations themselves, and neither established clear 
and specific valuation methodologies nor followed up their gen-
eral guidance to review and approve the actual methodologies 
used and the resulting valuations. Instead, they approved pol-
icies generally describing the factors to be considered but failed 
to determine what was actually being done to implement those 
policies. As a result, Fund Accounting implemented deficient 
procedures, effectively allowing the Portfolio Manager to deter-
mine valuations without a reasonable basis.128 
Another strand of cases involves situations where the invest-
ment adviser and portfolio manager are confronted with infor-
mation that raises doubts about the accuracy of the fund’s stated 
asset valuations. These “red flag” cases often include other mis-
conduct that raises some doubt on the accuracy of the adviser’s 
valuation practices. For example, in Evergreen Investment Man-
agement Company, also a settled administrative action, the ad-
viser allegedly failed to apprise the fund’s valuation committee of 
negative information concerning certain mortgage-backed securi-
ties held in the fund.129 
                                                                                                                         
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 2381. 
129 In re Evergreen Inv. Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 60,059, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 2888, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 28,759, 96 SEC Docket 118 (June 8, 2009); see also In re Lisa B. Premo, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3355, Investment Company Act Release 
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An example of a red flag occurred when the adviser learned that 
the issuer of a portfolio security would no longer pay out cash flow 
to the fund until a senior tranche of the security had been fully 
repaid to other investors.130 The adviser failed to pass this infor-
mation on to the valuation committee for some time.131 When the 
committee learned about the situation, it marked down the value 
of the security to zero, reducing the fund’s net asset value from 
$9.05 to $8.95 per share.132 The change in net asset value (“NAV”) 
was significant because the volatility of the fund was very low, fluc-
tuating between $9.20 and $9.73 for the previous year.133 
In another red flag cited in the administrative order, the ad-
viser’s portfolio management team received a dealer quote, which 
was substantially below the fund’s previous valuation of a security.134 
A member of the team contacted the broker to determine whether 
the quote was based on a “distressed” sale.135 If the transaction in-
volved a distressed sale, the portfolio manager could arguably justify 
overriding the dealer’s quote and maintaining a higher valuation 
to the valuation committee.136 However, the broker informed the 
portfolio management team that the security was “‘not coming from 
a distressed seller, just one that wanted to get out.’”137 Nonetheless, 
the portfolio management team misinformed the fund’s valuation 
committee “that they believed the sale was distressed and did not 
disclose the broker-dealer’s statement.”138 As a result, “at least in 
part” of this misinformation, the valuation committee declined to 
mark the security down, overriding the quote.139 
Evergreen, however, is not purely a red flags case. The matter 
also involved alleged selective disclosure of information, which 
compounded the impact of the fund’s overvaluation.140 After some 
time, the valuation committee of the fund decided to stop utilizing 
                                                                                                                         
No. 29,919, 2012 WL 1029026 (Jan. 17 2012) (settled matter involving related 
charges against portfolio manager of Evergreen funds). 










140 Id. at 123. 
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price overrides.141 This action resulted in a series of downward 
revisions of the prices of the portfolio securities.142 The revisions 
were not simultaneous and, as the fund’s securities began to ex-
perience mark downs, the fund’s distributor recognized that it 
would receive inquiries from clients and other interested parties.143 
The distributor prepared talking points for such inquiries.144 The 
talking points disclosed that the fund might continue to mark 
down securities in the portfolio. 145  In addition to these talking 
points, the fund’s distributor later contacted affiliated registered 
representatives to inform them of the situation and suggested that 
their clients could transfer their holdings to other funds in the 
fund complex.146 These disclosures advantaged the investors who 
received this material information since they now knew that the 
fund likely faced additional downward revisions of NAV.147 
Although less common, the Commission has brought other ac-
tions beside Alderman against fund boards.148 In Hammes, a settled 
administrative action, the Commission alleged that two bond funds 
that were overseen by a common board were fraudulently mis-
priced.149 The Commission’s action focused liability on a subset of 
the funds’ board—the members of the funds’ audit committee.150 
The Commission alleged that they “failed adequately to assure that 
those bonds were priced at ‘fair value’ or adequately to monitor 
and assure the bonds’ liquidity.”151 The order included charges of 
                                                                                                                         
141 Id. at 121. 





147 Id. at 123. 
148 See, e.g., In re Cornerstone Cap. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2778, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,380, 94 SEC Docket 
315 (Sept. 16, 2008) (settled matter); In re Hammes, Securities Act Release No. 
8346; Investment Company Act Release No. 26,290, 81 SEC Docket 2467, 2468 
(Dec. 11, 2003). 
149 Hammes, 81 SEC Docket at 2468. A related case included charges against 
the funds’ adviser, members of the pricing committee, and other employees of 
the adviser. See In re Heartland Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8884, 
Exchange Act Release No. 57,206, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2698, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,136, 92 SEC Docket 1306, 1306–07 
(Jan. 25, 2008) (settled matter). 
150 Hammes, 81 SEC Docket at 2468. 
151 Id. 
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the Securities Act’s antifraud provisions in Section 17(a)(2) and 
17(a)(3).152 The charges were based on five types of conduct perpe-
trated by board members: (1) they failed to monitor the liquidity 
of the securities to ensure the funds could meet shareholder re-
demptions; (2) they “passively rel[ied]” on valuation committee 
valuations; (3) they failed to “review financial statements, reports, 
contracts, and other documents relevant to the financial condi-
tion[s]” of a portfolio security; (4) they “failed to take adequate steps 
to follow up on their requests for information” from the adviser; 
and (5) they improperly applied a generic haircut to securities in 
lieu of conducting a fair value estimation.153 In addition, the order 
charged the board members with causing violations of Rule 22c-1(a) 
of the Investment Company Act because the misvalued securities 
were an inaccurate reflection the funds’ current NAV.154 
The recitation of events in the Hammes order suggests the 
board was extraordinarily inept at handling worsening conditions 
at the funds.155 Taken in isolation, each board action may not have 
amounted to a violation, but in its totality, the board’s course of 
conduct was ample justification for charges. At various meetings 
the board was notified that the funds’ portfolio of bonds was dete-
riorating.156 In one meeting, the board was informed that the funds 
were having difficulty liquidating bonds to meet redemptions, re-
lying heavily on the funds’ credit line to meet obligations.157 In 
another meeting, the board was informed that one fund held 18 
percent of its portfolio in illiquid bonds and the other fund held 6 
percent.158 As the board received this negative information, they 
requested a report from the adviser explaining any plans to work 
out the bonds, as well as quarterly progress reports.159 Despite 
continued deteriorating conditions, the Commission noted that the 
board failed to follow through on these requests since the adviser 
never completed the reports.160 
                                                                                                                         
152 Id. at 2472. 
153 Id. The order noted that the adviser also directly violated these statutes. Id. 
154 Id. The order noted that the adviser perpetrated a direct violation of Rule 
22c-1. Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 2469–71. 
157 Id. at 2469. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 2470. 
160 Id. 
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Conditions for the bonds in the funds continued to worsen. The 
funds struggled to meet redemption requests since many of the 
bonds were illiquid.161 In order to address the situation, the adviser 
sold some of the distressed bonds to another party.162 The trans-
action price, however, was below the valuation of the bonds in the 
funds.163 In order to close the transaction, the president of the ad-
viser personally guaranteed to the counterparty that it could 
“put” the bonds back to an affiliate.164 The transaction provided 
the counterparty with a guaranteed 20 percent annual return.165 
After the transaction, the adviser marked down the bonds in the 
portfolio further.166 These mark downs were still not reflective of 
market conditions since the adviser “refused or failed to sell suf-
ficient bonds held by the [f]unds to meet redemption requests, in 
large part because [the adviser] refused to value and sell the [f]unds’ 
bonds at prices it could reasonably expect to receive in a current 
sale of those bonds.”167 
Four days after the transaction, the board found that well over 
half of the funds’ remaining portfolios were illiquid.168 Despite ad-
vice from the board’s counsel that the securities should be assigned 
fair value rather than utilizing a pricing service, the board failed 
to instruct the pricing committee to fair value the bonds.169 The 
following day, however, the pricing committee began the process 
of re-pricing the bonds using fair value.170 The order noted prices 
were not changed retroactively for the previous trading day.171 
However, once the board received the fair values provided by the 
pricing committee, it applied uniform “haircuts” on the proposed 
fair values.172 The haircuts were applied “without determining 
whether such a haircut was appropriate for each portfolio secu-
rity” and the new values for the securities violated the board’s 
                                                                                                                         
161 Id. at 2471. 




166 Id. at 2470–71. 
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obligation to “fair value” securities when market quotations were 
not available.173 
Enforcement matters that squarely address an adviser’s meth-
odology as falling outside the standards set in the Investment Com-
pany Act or Commission guidance are extremely rare. 174  The 
Parnassus Investments matter, in which the Commission charged 
the adviser and board members of the fund, is the most recent 
matter, and represents, unsurprisingly, a fairly egregious fact 
pattern.175 In Parnassus, the adviser managed an open-end mu-
tual fund that followed a contrarian investment strategy.176 One 
investment in the portfolio was a stock position in a financially 
troubled company, Margaux.177 Margaux declared bankruptcy.178 
Although the fund held Margaux common stock prior to the bank-
ruptcy, the adviser concluded that Margaux was undervalued and 
purchased more common stock as well as loaned an additional 
$100,000 to the company.179 The adviser understood that the loan 
had a conversion right, but the loan agreement did not contain 
any such language, making the conversion right subject to ap-
proval by the bankruptcy court.180 Margaux’s financial problems 
persisted and the company was delisted, ultimately becoming a 
thinly traded over-the-counter stock.181 After several setbacks, 
the company ceased operations.182 
                                                                                                                         
173 Id. at 2472. 
174 See Grim, supra note 2 (discussing review of methodologies depends on 
the situation and circumstances). 
175 In re Parnassus Invs., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 
1071, 67 SEC Docket 2013 (Sept. 3, 1998) (default order); In re Parnassus Invs., 
Exchange Act Release No. 40,534, 68 SEC Docket 364 (Oct. 8, 1998) (Notice 
that Initial Decision Has Become Final). Besides the valuation component of Par-
nassus, the adviser’s conduct touched on other issues. The adviser invested out-
side its stated investment policy, limiting loans to repurchase agreements, by 
extending a direct loan to a company in violation of Sections 13(a)(3) and 21(a) 
of the Investment Company Act. In addition, the adviser’s soft dollar practices 
violated Section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act, as well as related 
disclosure violations under Section 207 of the Advisers Act. See id. at 364–65. 
176 Parnassus Invs., 67 SEC Docket at 2014. 
177 Id. at 2014–15. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 2015. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 2016–17. 
182 Id. at 2019. 
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Beginning with the bankruptcy, the adviser in Parnassus took 
steps, with the approval of the board, to value the Margaux holding 
contrary to Rule 22c-1 of the Investment Company Act and the 
Commission’s guidance in the Accounting Series Releases for 
good faith valuation of a security. 183 First, the adviser valued the 
loan as if it was converted to restricted stock and eventually added a 
10 percent premium to the restricted shares.184 The administra-
tive law judge cited ASR 113 and quoted Commission guidance 
that restricted stock typically should hold a discount to free trading 
stock “except for the most unusual circumstances.”185 The admin-
istrative law judge concluded a significant discount was appropriate 
because, after the delisting, Margaux’s stock was thinly traded, 
presenting significant liquidity concerns.186 
Second, after the Margaux shares were delisted, the Parnassus 
adviser began to fair value the fund’s common stock holdings.187 
The adviser valued the securities based on Margaux being a potential 
acquisition target.188 The administrative law judge observed that 
the adviser and board did not identify any unusual circumstances 
justifying a departure from discounting the restricted stock right.189 
The judge also noted the adviser’s “valuation methodology clearly 
accorded great weight to certain intangibles” including the firm’s 
management, “innovative technology,” and relationship with its pri-
mary customer.190 Enforcement staff described the adviser’s fair 
valuation approach as a “‘long-term sale of the company ap-
proach,’” inconsistent with seeking the current value of the holding 
under Rule 22c-1.191 
In concluding that the adviser’s approach overvalued the Mar-
gaux common stock holding, the administrative law judge drew 
on the factors identified in ASR 118 for fund boards to consider in 
reaching a fair value of a security.192 The judge concluded that the 
                                                                                                                         
183 Id. at 2022. 
184 Id. at 2016. 
185 Id. at 2021. 
186 Id. at 2023. 
187 Id. at 2016. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 2023. 
190 Id. at 2024. 
191 Id. at 2024–26 (quoting Commission’s allegation). 
192 Id. at 2025. 
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adviser and the board “ignored or failed to give adequate consid-
eration to a number of the general and specific factors set forth in 
ASR 118.”193 The judge found, for example, that the valuation 
failed to take into account the absence of firms interested in ac-
quiring Margaux, the implications of Margaux’s delisting, the 
firm’s financial statements, and trading prices.194 Because these 
factors were not taken into account, the judge concluded that the 
holding was not valued based on what the fund “could receive under 
current, albeit unfavorable, conditions, but according to what the 
[f]und might receive if the so-called ‘true’ value were realized upon 
sale of the entire company or a controlling portion therein.”195 
B. The Advisers Act and Valuation 
1. Statutory Framework 
The Advisers Act imposes general antifraud provisions on all 
investment advisers.196 For situations involving an adviser’s in-
accurate valuation of securities, Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act 
is the most important of the antifraud provisions because scienter 
is not an element to prove a violation; instead, it establishes a 
fiduciary duty upon all investment advisers.197 The Supreme Court 
articulated the fiduciary duty concept in SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc.198 The Supreme Court drew on the purpose 
of the federal securities laws “to substitute a philosophy of full 
                                                                                                                         
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 2026. 
196 General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. 
AND EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment 
/iaregulation/memoia.htm [https://perma.cc/DX48-MAXW]. 
197 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (2012). Notably, 
the Investment Company Act does not have an equivalent provision. However, 
Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act empowers the Commission to 
seek relief against officers, directors, members of any advisory board, advisers, 
investment advisers, depositors, or principal underwriters of a registered invest-
ment company for “any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty[.]” 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a). In addition, the Investment Company Act has provisions 
for false filings by a registered investment company under Section 34(b), which 
would apply to false valuations. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). 
198 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). 
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disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve 
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”199 
Under the Court’s interpretation of Section 206(2) in Capital 
Gains, the adviser, as a fiduciary to its client, is obligated to dis-
close potential conflicts of interest. As the Court explained: 
An investor seeking the advice of a registered investment adviser 
must, if the legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted to 
evaluate ... overlapping motivations, through appropriate dis-
closure, in deciding whether an adviser is serving “two mas-
ters” or only one “especially ... if one of the masters happens to 
be economic self-interest.”200  
For violations of Section 206(2), the Commission is not re-
quired to show economic harm to investors201 or that the adviser 
had scienter to defraud the client.202 The Commission has utilized 
Section 206(2) in a variety of enforcement actions.203 The concept 
has not been fully developed in enforcement actions involving val-
uation, although at least one action discussed in more detail in 
Section I.B.2 alleged a Section 206(2) violation.204 
                                                                                                                         
199 Id. at 186 (italics in original). 
200 Id. at 196 (citing U.S. v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 
549 (1961)). 
201 See, e.g., Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2003); SEC v. 
Slocum, Gordon, & Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 144, 149 (D.R.I. 2004); In re Funda-
mental Portfolio Advisors, Securities Act Release No. 33-8251, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-48; Investment Company Act Release No. 26,099; 80 SEC 
Docket 1851, 1863 (July 15, 2003) (Commission decision). 
202 Instead, courts have applied a test of simple negligence. See Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 195; SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 
643 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992); SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43, 72 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d 
in part, SEC v. Washington Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
203 See, e.g., In re Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., Exchange Act Release 
No. 71850, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3808, 108 SEC Docket 2522 
at 6 (Apr. 3, 2014) (miscalculation of client fees); In re Western Asset Mgmt. 
Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3763, 108 SEC Docket 673 at 6 
(Jan. 27, 2014) (failure to reimburse clients pursuant to internal policies); In 
re Martin Currie Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 30,062, Investment 
Adviser Act Release No. 3404, 103 SEC Docket 2336, 2345–46 (May 6, 2012) 
(discussing an adviser who directed one fund to transact with another fund for 
the purpose of maintaining liquidity in the second fund); In re Palmer, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 2757, 93 SEC Docket 2316, 2318 (July 23, 2008) 
(unauthorized transfers from two private funds designed to satisfy margin calls 
on a third fund). 
204 See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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Conceptually, an adviser’s fiduciary duty extends to its valua-
tion policies. An adviser’s valuation presents potential conflicts of 
interest wherein the adviser may have incentives to reach an at-
tractive valuation to reap higher fees, or otherwise benefit itself, to 
the detriment of the fund and the fund’s investors.205 For example, 
an adviser that consistently selects a valuation methodology that is 
higher than alternative methodologies could expose itself to a Sec-
tion 206(2) violation if it did not disclose this conflict. To date, the 
Commission has not taken this approach in enforcement actions, and 
has instead focused on other factors discussed previously.206 
The remaining antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act are 
similar to the antifraud provisions in the Securities Act and Ex-
change Act.207 Section 206(1) prohibits advisers from employing 
“any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any client or prospective 
client[.]”208 Scienter is required to show a Section 206(1) violation.209 
Because of the Commission’s interpretation of “client” over the 
years, Section 206(1) is often utilized in situations where the adviser 
serves clients in separately managed accounts. 210  In contrast, 
                                                                                                                         
205 At least one author has described valuation issues in the context of con-
flicts of interest in discussing adviser’s valuation policies over private funds. 
See Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge 
Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3267–68 (2009). 
206 See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text in discussing the types of 
theories the Commission has generally brought. 
207 There are important differences in the basic elements of the Advisers Act 
and Exchange Act provisions. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange 
Act, for example, require the fraudulent conduct be “in connection with” a pur-
chase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.01b-6 
(2012). No such requirement is present for Section 206 violations. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-6. 
208 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1). 
209 See, e.g., Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2003); SEC v. 
Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 
1126, 1134 (5th Cir. 1979) aff’d on other grounds, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); SEC v. 
EagleEye Mgmt., 975 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D. Mass. 2013); SEC v. Treadway, 
430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43, 66 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
210 Historically, a pooled investment vehicle was counted as one client ra-
ther than counting each investor in the vehicle as an individual client. See 
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006). After the Goldstein deci-
sion, there was some doubt whether Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers 
Act applied to fraudulent conduct that harmed investors of pooled investment 
vehicles. See, e.g., SEC v. Northshore Asset Mgmt. 2008 WL 1968299, at n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). In contrast, the Commodity Futures Trade Commission has 
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Section 206(4) and related Rule 206(4)-8 specifically address an 
adviser’s fraudulent conduct in pooled investment vehicles. 211 
Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits advisers from two general categories of con-
duct. The rule prohibits advisers from making “any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact ....”212 It also 
prohibits advisers from engaging in “any act, practice, or course 
of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with re-
spect to any investor or prospective investor[.]”213 Like Section 
206(2), these provisions have been utilized in a variety of contexts, 
including cases that have a valuation component.214 However, un-
like Section 206(2), these provisions tend to reach more overtly 
fraudulent conduct because of the scienter element. 
                                                                                                                         
counted clients of commodity trading advisers by individual investor. See 7 
U.S.C. § 6(m) (2010). Prior to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, advisers could avoid registration 
when they managed funds on behalf of no more than fifteen clients where cli-
ents were interpreted to count a fund as one client. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) 
(2010). The legislation repealed this provision. 
211 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2015). 
212 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(1). 
213 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(2). 
214 The conduct in many of these cases meets the legal requirements of mul-
tiple antifraud provisions, including Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. See, e.g., 
In re West Coast Asset Mgmt., Securities Act Release No. 33-9501, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3746, 107 SEC Docket 5599, 5600 (Dec. 23, 2015) (dis-
cussing misrepresentations to investor regarding prior redemption activity of 
a fund triggered Sections 206(2), 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 violation in addition 
to a Securities Act violation); In re F-Squared Investments, Inc., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 31,393, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3988, 
110 SEC Docket 2953 at 10 (Dec. 22, 2014) (misleading back-testing of perfor-
mance data of adviser’s strategy included violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), 
206(4)-8, and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Advisers Act); In re Ambassador Cap. Mgmt., 
Initial Decision Release No. 672, 108 SEC Docket 2637 at 1 (Sept. 19, 2014) (dis-
cussing an adviser’s misleading statements to board regarding a fund’s exposure 
to mortgage-backed securities violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2), among others); 
In re Chariot Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 72,541, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 31,149, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3872, 108 SEC 
Docket 930 at 9 (July 3, 2014) (discussing an adviser’s misrepresentations to 
fund board regarding trading strategy violated Sections 206(2), 206(4) and Rule 
206(4)-8 of the Advisers Act among others); In re Oppenheimer Funds, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-9329, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67142, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 30,099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3417, 103 
SEC Docket 2830, 2834 (June 6, 2012) (Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 viola-
tions among others); In re Quantek Asset Mgmt., Securities Act Release No. 
33-9326, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,085, Investment Advisers Act 
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Although the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act reach 
all advisers, nearly all of the specific prohibitions and rules-based 
provisions apply only to registered advisers or advisers required 
to be registered.215 The threshold for adviser registration is based 
primarily on the adviser’s assets under management.216 Once reg-
istered, advisers assume certain obligations under the Advisers Act, 
which extend to their advisory activities over any individual cli-
ents, registered investment companies, or private funds under 
management.217 Unlike the Investment Company Act, however, 
these obligations are largely principles based regulations and touch 
on valuation indirectly. 
As a result, the provisions of the Advisers Act focus on disclosure, 
with a particular emphasis on revealing conflicts of interest. Advis-
ers are obligated to file Form ADV and a related brochure, which 
are publicly available.218 Among other things, Form ADV requires 
the advisor to state its regulatory assets under management,219 
                                                                                                                         
Release No. 3408, 103 SEC Docket 2677, 2683 (May 29, 2012) (concerning ad-
viser of private fund misrepresentations of “skin in the game,” related party 
transactions, and investment process triggering Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-
8 violations among others). 
215 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
216 The Advisers Act currently requires advisers to register if they have at least 
$100 million in assets under management. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II). 
The Advisers Act affords an exception to registration for advisers who manage 
private funds and have U.S. assets under management of less than $150 mil-
lion. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1). Advisers below these thresholds must typi-
cally register with the states in which they operate. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a). 
A variety of advisers with less than $100 million may still register with the 
Commission if they meet certain criteria. For example, advisers who provide ser-
vices primarily through the Internet may register with Commission regardless 
of their assets under management. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-2(e). 
217 Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 23, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/adv 
overview.htm [https://perma.cc/5VCH-AEUB]. 
218 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(a). 
219 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV, UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR 
INVESTMENT ADVISOR REGISTRATION AND REPORT BY EXEMPT REPORTING AD-
VISORS, pt. 1A, item 1, at 9–10, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/UC39-LJLW] [hereinafter Form ADV]. Regulatory assets under man-
agement may vary substantially from an adviser’s actual assets under man-
agement because the definition excludes netting indebtedness or other accrued 
but unpaid liabilities. In addition, if an adviser’s portfolio derives less than 50 
percent of its value from securities, it is excluded. See id. at pt. 1A, instruction 
5b, at 7. 
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asset value in accounts held by the adviser,220 gross asset value of 
any private fund;221 and identify auditors222 and third parties re-
sponsible for valuing any portfolio assets.223 Populating Form ADV 
with incorrect information, such as inaccurate regulatory assets 
under management, constitutes a separate violation from the anti-
fraud provisions224 and does not require a showing of scienter.225 
More generally, the Advisers Act also has provisions governing a 
registered adviser’s advertising materials, which could touch on 
valuation to the extent that performance is exaggerated because of 
inflated asset values.226 Like misleading statements in the Form 
ADV, such misstatements constitute a securities violation.227 
Registered advisers are also required to complete Form PF for 
private funds the adviser manages if it meets a certain dollar thresh-
old.228 Form PF requires a more detailed description of the private 
fund’s investments than is required in Form ADV. Many aspects 
of Form PF require valuation information, such as: identifying the 
investment style of the fund and the associated regulatory assets 
under management and net assets under management;229 a break-
down of the U.S. GAAP valuation hierarchy of the private fund’s 
                                                                                                                         
220 See id. at pt. 1A, item 9, at 14. 
221 See id. at sched. D, item 11, at 7. 
222 See id. at sched. D, item 23, at 9. 
223 See id. at sched. D, item 27, at 10. This item requires the adviser to iden-
tify the proportion of the assets under management that are valued by third 
parties. Id. 
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (2012). 
225 See, e.g., SEC v. K.W. Brown and Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 
2007); In re Fields, Securities Act Release No. 9727, Exchange Act Release No. 
74,344, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,461, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 4028, 2015 WL 728005 at *28 n.101 (Feb. 20, 2015); In re Montford 
and Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3829, 2014 WL 10761140 at *27 
(May 2, 2014); In re Knelman Asset Mgmt. Group, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 30,766, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3705, 107 SEC Docket 
2976, 2980 n.4 (Oct. 28, 2013) (settled matter); In re Warwick Capital Mgmt., 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2694, 92 SEC Docket 1137, 1144 (Jan. 16, 
2008); In re Disraeli, 90 SEC Docket 385, 397 (March 5, 2007). 
226 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (2015). 
227 See id. 
228 In order for obligations to file Form PF to be triggered, the adviser must man-
age at least $150 million in private fund assets. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1(a). 
229 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF, REPORTING FORM FOR INVEST-
MENT ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS 
AND COMMODITY TRADING ADVISORS, § 1a, item B, at 2–3, https://www.sec.gov/rules 
/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7692-F68B]. 
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assets by asset class;230  and fund performance information.231 
Certain large advisers must provide additional information.232 
Like Form ADV, if an adviser files an inaccurate Form PF, it is 
subject to liability.233 
Some Advisers Act provisions touch on portfolio valuation by 
creating operational obligations. Rule 206(4)-2 requires that advisory 
clients receive statements on at least a quarterly basis “identify-
ing the amount of funds and of each security in the account at the 
end of the period[.]”234 More significantly, the rule mandates that 
certain advisers retain an accounting firm to conduct surprise ex-
aminations or issue financial statements on an annual basis.235 
For example, an adviser managing a pooled investment vehicle 
must obtain and distribute to investors an audited financial state-
ment or subject itself to an annual surprise examination.236 These 
activities require a third party, an accountant, to review the val-
uation of the securities held in the investment vehicle.237 
Rule 206(4)-7 is another operational rule that touches on val-
uation. The rule requires the development of “written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation” of the Ad-
visers Act.238 Like the counterpart compliance rule for registered 
investment companies,239 the rule does not enumerate specific ele-
ments that advisers should implement in their policies and proce-
dures.240 However, the Commission’s adoption release for the rule 
makes plain that the mandated policies and procedures should 
address the adviser’s “[p]rocesses to value client holdings and 
                                                                                                                         
230 See id. § 1b, item B, at 5–6. 
231 See id. § 1b, item C, at 7–8. 
232 These additional disclosures are triggered by certain advisers who have 
assets under management of $1.5 billion or more. See id. ¶ 3, at 2. 
233 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1 (requiring 
most investment adviser applicants to file Form ADV); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1 
(requiring certain investment advisers to submit Form PF). 
234 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(3). 
235 See 17 C.F.R.§ 275.206(4)-2(a)(4). 
236 See 17 C.F.R.§ 275.206(4)-2(b)(4). 
237 See id. 
238 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(a). 
239 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(2) (2006) (to the extent an adviser is provid-
ing services to a registered investment company, the company’s board reviews 
the adviser’s policies and procedures to determine their robustness). 
240 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7. 
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assess fees based on those valuations[.]”241 One purpose in sub-
jecting advisers to registration and to this compliance regime was 
to address frauds that involved, among other things, “improper 
valuation of assets.”242  
2. Commission Administrative Actions 
The Commission has brought several administrative actions 
against advisers of private funds for Advisers Act violations. En-
forcement cases rely primarily on violations of Section 206. The 
fact patterns in these cases have varied widely and included situ-
ations where the adviser failed to follow the valuation procedures 
represented to investors;243 the adviser misrepresented the port-
folio despite contradicting authoritative evidence;244 the adviser’s 
valuations were part of a larger effort to fraudulently inflate asset 
values;245 and the adviser’s basis for a valuation was no longer 
                                                                                                                         
241 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advis-
ers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 81 SEC Docket 2775, 2779 
(Dec. 17, 2003). 
242 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 84 SEC Docket 1032, 1047 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
243 See, e.g., In re Retirement Inv. Advisors, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
76,218, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4237, 2015 WL 6352065 at *2 
(Oct. 21, 2015) (settled matter); In re Lynn Tilton, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 31,539, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4053, Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3644, 2015 WL 1407564 at *2 (Mar. 30, 
2015) (proceeding ongoing); In re Oppenheimer Asset Mgmt., Inc., Securities 
Act Release No. 33-9390, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-3566, 105 
SEC Docket 3387, 3387–88 (Mar. 11, 2013) (settled matter). 
244 See In re Leaddog Cap. Markets, LLC, Release No. 468, 104 SEC Docket 
2604, 2608 (Sept. 14, 2012), aff’d, Release No. 68,205, 104 SEC Docket 3996, 
3996 (Nov. 9, 2012). In Leaddog, the adviser of a private fund distributed a due 
diligence questionnaire to a potential investor falsely claiming that the fund 
held approximately 50 percent of its assets in illiquid investments. However, 
the fund’s audited financial statements disclosed that the fund held a much 
higher percentage—92 percent—of fund assets as illiquid. Id. at 2608. 
245 See, e.g., In re Kuperman, Securities Act Release No. 10,009, Exchange 
Act Release No. 76,991, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4323, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 31,973, 2016 WL 336086 at 3–4 (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10009.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSF2 
-YCMB], (settled matter) (regarding an adviser overvaluation of an illiquid penny 
stock holding that comprised over 20 percent of the portfolio); In re Alphabridge 
Cap. Mgmt., LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4135, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 31,700, 2015 WL 3982040 at 2 (July 1, 2015), https://www 
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valid.246 This last category of administrative cases—the adviser’s 
basis for valuation—represent more unusual examples of scruti-
nizing an adviser’s valuation methodology. 
The Oppenheimer settled matter provides a good illustration of an 
adviser that allegedly failed to follow its valuation procedures.247 
The adviser managed a private fund that invested in other funds—a 
fund of funds.248 The pitch book describing the fund of funds dis-
closed that its assets were valued based on the prices provided by 
the underlying managers of the funds.249 The portfolio manager, 
however, elected to discard the stated value of one underlying fund 
and instead used a higher valuation.250 The deviation in values 
                                                                                                                         
.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4135.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYF4-L65T] (set-
tled matter) (involving a scheme to use manipulated broker quotes to prop up 
securities valuation); In re John Thomas Cap. Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Initial Decision 
Release No. 693, 2014 WL 5304908 at 19, (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.sec.gov 
/alj/aljdec/2014/id693cff.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW78-M98J], enforcing, Securities 
Act Release No. 9396, 105 SEC Docket 4051, 4053–54 (Mar. 22, 2013) (partially 
settled matter, litigation ongoing) (involving an adviser who used several ma-
nipulative devices, including a stock touter to manipulate the value of portfolio 
stocks upward, and inconsistent valuations of the same securities across funds); 
In re Oxford Inv. Partners, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3553, 
105 SEC Docket 2870, 2870, 2871 (Feb. 15, 2013) (settled matter) (involving 
valuation derived from baseless projections of the adviser’s business in an ef-
fort to sell a stake in the adviser); In re Koch, Release No. 707, 103 SEC Docket 
3339, 3340 (June 15, 2012), modifying, Release No. 458, 103 SEC Docket 2664, 
2664 (May 24, 2012) (regarding an effort to mark the close, and also inflated, 
net asset values of clients). 
246 See, e.g., In re Bunzel, Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 67,140, Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 3416, Investment Company Act of 1940 
Release No. 30,098, 103 SEC Docket 2941, 2942–43 (June 6, 2012) (settled mat-
ter); In re Cornerstone Cap. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Re-
lease No. 2855, 95 SEC Docket 1379, 1380 (Mar. 20, 2009) (settled matter); In 
re Springer Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2434, 86 
SEC Docket 803, 805 (Sept. 21, 2005) (settled matter). In one recent settled 
matter, a third party administrator played a role in inappropriately valuing 
private funds by failing to address recurring loans made by the adviser that 
remained unpaid. See In re Apex Fund Servs. (US), Inc., Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 4429, 2016 WL 3345650 (June 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov 
/litigation/admin/2016/ia-4429.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4T2-G9BZ]. The settle-
ment charged the administrator with causing the adviser’s violation of Sections 
206(2) and 206(4) of the Advisers Act. Id. 
247 See In re Oppenheimer Asset Mgmt., Inc., 105 SEC Docket at 3389. 
248 Id. at 3387. 
249 Id. at 3388. 
250 Id. at 3389. 
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caused “a material increase in the value ... and ... performance” of the 
fund of funds.251 
While the portfolio manager’s work group modified the perfor-
mance table in the pitch book, they failed to revise the valuation 
disclosure or to submit the revised pitch book to the adviser’s com-
pliance department.252 According to the administrative order, “[d]ur-
ing their marketing efforts, the [p]ortfolio [m]anager and others in 
his group touted the performance of [the underlying fund and the 
fund of funds] to prospective investors[.]”253 The employees made 
other misrepresentations concerning the investment as well, such 
as making claims that the underlying fund was audited and the 
increased value was a reflection of the underlying fund’s perfor-
mance.254 In addition to violations of Section 206(4) and related 
Rule 206(4)-(8) of the Advisers Act, the parties agreed to settle on 
charges of deficient policies and procedures and the antifraud pro-
visions of the Securities Act.255 
The Cornerstone Capital settled matter explored a situation 
where the adviser allegedly refused to make downward adjust-
ments of portfolio security valuations, despite being confronted 
with adverse information that strongly suggested the securities 
were impaired.256 The adviser managed client funds in separately 
managed accounts.257 The settled order did not discuss the ad-
viser’s valuation methodology on the accounts, focusing instead 
on the headings in quarterly client statements that listed the 
“market price” and “total market value” of the various invest-
ments the client held.258 The Commission Order suggests that the 
adviser’s selection of investments was poor since many were ulti-
mately fraudulent.259 For example, the adviser invested client 
funds in a currency exchange program that later was raided by 
Costa Rican authorities.260 The authorities seized assets and froze 
bank accounts, arrested one of the program’s promoters, and charged 




254 Id. at 3390. 
255 Id. 
256 In re Cornerstone Cap. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 2855, 95 SEC Docket 1379, 1380 (Mar. 20, 2009). 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 1381. 
259 See id. at 1380. 
260 Id. at 1381. 
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him with fraud. 261  The adviser was aware of the arrest and 
charges.262 In addition, the adviser read news reports, including 
an article from The Wall Street Journal describing the program 
“as a classic Ponzi scheme,” and learned that the program ceased 
operations and ceased paying interest payments.263 Despite knowing 
these issues, the adviser continued to send clients quarterly state-
ments that showed the value of the investment in the program at 
cost plus accrued interest.264 Based on this example and other 
similar scenarios, the parties settled to Section 206(1) and 206(2) 
Advisers Act charges.265 
In contrast to Cornerstone Capital, the Bunzel settled matter 
addressed the adviser’s valuation methodology in two commonly 
managed private funds that were structured as partnerships.266 
In Bunzel, the adviser, who was the general partner of both funds, 
could set a value that he “may reasonably determine in good 
faith.”267 The Order focused on the adviser’s reasonableness in 
setting a valuation and did not explore whether the adviser was 
acting in good faith.268 In other words, the alleged violation came 
about because of the unreasonableness of the valuation in light of 
the factors that the adviser used to justify it.269 
The funds’ largest investment was in a privately held registered 
investment adviser that was first acquired in the 1990s.270 Over 
time, the adviser adjusted the value of this investment upward based 
on the price at which the firm bought or sold its shares in private 
transactions.271 In 2008, these adjustments grew dramatically; 
the adviser raised the value of the holding by 88 percent as of 





265 Id. at 1379–80, 1383. 
266 See, e.g., In re Bunzel, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 67,140, 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 3416, Investment Company Act 
of 1940 Release No. 30,098, 103 SEC Docket 2941, 2942–43 (June 6, 2012) (set-
tled matter). 
267 Id.  
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 2943. 
270 Id. at 2942. 
271 Id. 
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August 2008.272 With this higher value, the holding comprised 76 
percent of the total portfolio.273 The adviser relied on four reasons 
for the increased valuation: (1) the portfolio firm had preliminary 
discussions to repurchase shares for approximately the valuation 
price; (2) the portfolio company’s assets under management grew 
substantially during 2008; (3) the portfolio company’s revenues 
were increasing substantially; and (4) the adviser attempted to 
make comparisons to other large publicly traded companies in the 
financial sector.274 
However, by December 2008, all of these factors changed dra-
matically, and the Commission alleged “there was no reasonable 
basis to support [the adviser’s] valuation” because the adviser’s 
reasons that supported the valuation “no longer existed.”275 The 
Order observes that the portfolio firm’s discussion to repurchase 
shares had “ceased” by October 2008 and that its assets under 
management and revenues decreased substantially from earlier 
periods.276 Further, “financial markets became extremely vola-
tile—especially financial sector stocks.”277 Despite these adverse 
events, the adviser failed to reduce its valuation of the investment 
until 2010 when two valuation firms suggested the value of the 
funds’ holdings in the firm were significantly lower.278 The parties 
settled to charges of violations of Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-
(8) of the Advisers Act.279 
II. THE COURT CASES AND THE ANTIFRAUD STATUTES 
A. General Court Views on Valuations in Private Actions 
Advisory clients and investors seeking redress from advisers 
typically rely on the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and 
                                                                                                                         
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 2942–43. 
274 Id. at 2943. 
275 Id. (emphasis added). 
276 Id.  
277 Id. 
278 Id.  
279 Bunzel also involved other conduct not related to valuations. In particular, 
the order also discussed the adviser’s failure to obtain audited financial state-
ments and obtaining management fees in excess of those disclosed to the funds’ 
investors. See id. at 2943–44. 
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Exchange Act.280 Although the precise elements of these provi-
sions vary, they are similar and somewhat analogous to the Section 
206 provisions in the Advisers Act.281 The core theory of liability 
for the Securities Exchange Act provisions is that an adviser’s in-
accurate portfolio valuations may become material misstatements 
of fact.282 Beside the typical hurdles in bringing a claim under 
Section 17(a), Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,283 courts have been 
reluctant to entertain claims based on valuation.284 
                                                                                                                         
280 Private plaintiffs are largely foreclosed from relying on provisions of the 
Investment Company Act and Advisers Act to bring a claim; however, private 
litigants may allege various common law claims related to such situations. See, 
e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2012). However, 
such a theory would likely be difficult to prevail except in egregious cases. See, 
e.g., Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 440, 
442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing a suit grounded in New York common law 
alleging, among other things, fraudulent credit ratings that inflated the value 
of certain mortgage-backed securities). Another indirect potential avenue for 
private investors who participated in registered investment companies—which 
may also be difficult—is to argue the adviser’s fee, as a result of valuation is-
sues, was excessive. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Associates, 559 U.S. 335, 346 
(2010) (finding adviser’s fees must be “so disproportionately large that it bears 
no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been 
the product of arm’s length bargaining.”); see also Sivolella v. AXA Equitable 
Life Ins. Co., Slip Op., 2016 WL 4487857 (Aug. 25, 2016). 
281 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6a. 
282 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r. 
283 The antifraud provisions have a number of requirements that are neces-
sary to satisfy a claim and to prevail successfully. These provisions require that 
any alleged misstatements or omissions of facts be material; therefore, courts 
have defined material facts as information for which there is a substantial like-
lihood that a reasonable investor would consider in making an investment de-
cision. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32, 238 (1988) (citing 
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968)). For most pro-
visions, courts also require the perpetrators of the fraud to have scienter—“a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). More recently, the Supreme 
Court has also placed additional requirements on who may be liable for making 
such statements. See Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 
U.S. 135, 144 (2011). 
284 Private litigants also face additional judicial scrutiny because of the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012) 
(requiring securities fraud complaints to specify each misleading statement 
and set forth the facts on which a belief that a statement is misleading was 
formed). See, e.g., Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Bank of Am., 974 F. Supp. 
2d 341, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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Courts’ reluctance in accepting plaintiff theories related to 
misvaluation of portfolio assets is grounded in views regarding 
statements of value for purposes of the antifraud statutes. In an-
alyzing statements for potential liability under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, courts have divided statements into two categories: 
statements of fact and statements of opinion.285 The seminal case 
in this area is Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg.286 In Virginia 
Bankshares, a company’s board of directors provided its reasoning 
for voting for a forced buyout of minority shareholders by disclosing 
that the board thought the buyout price was attractive in a proxy 
statement.287 The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, filed an action 
alleging violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act related to 
misstatements in proxy solicitations.288 The plaintiff contended 
that the statement concerning the attractiveness of the buyout 
price was untrue because it was not an attractive offer and the 
board voted in favor of the resolution under pressure from the 
majority shareholder.289 The Supreme Court in Virginia Bank-
shares faced somewhat of a conundrum because the inquiry for a 
statement of fact under Section 14(a)—as well as other antifraud 
provisions—was whether the statement was untrue.290 However, 
the board in Virginia Bankshares was expressing an opinion.291 
The Court acknowledged that opinion statements can be mislead-
ing, but cabined the scope of review: 
Attacks on the truth of directors’ statements of reasons or belief, 
however, need carry no such threats. Such statements are factual 
in two senses: as statements that the directors do act for the rea-
sons given or hold the belief stated and as statements about the 
subject matter of the reason or belief expressed .... Reasons for di-
rectors’ recommendations or statements of belief are ... charac-
teristically matters of corporate record subject to documentation, to 
be supported or attacked by evidence of historical fact outside a 
plaintiff’s control. Such evidence would include not only corpo-
rate minutes and other statements of the directors themselves, but 
circumstantial evidence bearing on the facts that would reasonably 
underlie the reasons claimed and the honesty of any statement that 
                                                                                                                         
285 Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991). 
286 See generally id.  
287 Id. at 1084. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 1088–89. 
290 Id. at 1086–87. 
291 Id. at 1098. 
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those reasons are the basis for a recommendation or other action, a 
point that becomes especially clear when the reasons or beliefs go 
to valuation in dollars and cents.292 
With Virginia Bankshares as a guide, subsequent courts have 
evaluated the contours of statements concerning valuations to de-
lineate pure opinions from quantifiable and verifiable facts. In 
some cases, courts conclude that the only area of liability in a state-
ment is whether the speaker of the statement did not believe the 
opinion uttered because the statement was ultimately subjective.293 
For example, a number of cases have been brought by disgruntled 
investors against public companies who allegedly misvalued mort-
gage-backed securities.294 The general fact pattern of these cases is 
that the company held the asset on its balance sheet and failed to 
mark down the value in a timely fashion as market conditions for 
the security became adverse.295 The courts emphasized that the 
securities were complex and reliant on pricing models, which re-
quired some element of judgment.296 
Courts have been unreceptive of other fraud claims in situations 
similar to an adviser’s efforts to fair-value securities in a fund. For 
example, one strand of cases treating valuation as entirely subjective 
and immune to most claims of fraud relates to situations where ap-
plicable accounting guidance provides wide latitude to the party 
valuing the security.297 Further, in these situations, courts have 
                                                                                                                         
292 Id. at 1092–93. 
293 See, e.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2011). 
294 Fulton Cty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv., 675 F.3d 1047, 1048 (7th Cir. 2012). 
295 See Fait, 655 F.3d at 108; In re Barclays Bank PLC Sec. Litig., No. 09 
Civ. 1989 (PAC), 2011 WL 31548, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2011). 
296 See, e.g., Fait, 655 F.3d at 110–11 (plaintiff could not provide an objective 
standard for the price of the securities); Fulton Cty., 2010 WL 5095294, at *5, 
10, 12 (The valuation required “technical concepts” and “there was no single value 
that could have been applied ... and deemed the ‘true value’ of the securities.”).  
297 See, e.g., MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, 
L.P. 761 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2014) (Plaintiff’s allegation that issuer falsely 
claimed that mortgage portfolio would not be further impaired under GAAP 
based on internal analysis and input from independent experts rejected be-
cause it was an opinion); see also Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 
679 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (Plaintiff’s allegations that goodwill review involving 
valuation of certain assets should have been done earlier, at most, reflected 
“failure to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles [(“GAAP”)], 
rather than their commission of securities fraud[.]”); Fait, 655 F.3d at 110–11 
(calculations of goodwill depend on management’s judgment); Pa. Pub. Sys. 
Emps.’ Ret. v. Bank of Am., 874 F. Supp. 2d 341, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re 
Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
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ruled that it is not enough for plaintiffs to show a variance in their 
approach to how a security should be valued—the plaintiff must 
also show the dollar impact of the variance.298 Other cases em-
phasize the speculative nature of valuations of certain securities, 
especially where there is no historical data to establish a value.299 
In these cases, generalized disclaimers in a prospectus are sufficient 
warnings to investors regarding subsequent adverse events.300 
An interesting application of court views on valuation is In re 
Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litigation.301 In that case, plaintiffs al-
leged that an analyst’s valuations were overly optimistic.302 The 
plaintiffs argued the analyst had an inherent conflict of interest 
in writing his reports since his employer was an underwriter to 
the same issuers.303 The plaintiffs found emails where the analyst 
doubted the veracity of his own reports.304 For reports written after 
the emails, the court found that plaintiffs could allege a violation 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.305 However, for reports issued 
prior to the emails, the court foreclosed liability.306 The court’s 
reasoning turned on a number of factors, including disclosure that 
the research reports were speculative and that the analyses were 
marked by a “very low predictability of fundamentals and a high 
                                                                                                                         
(discussing relevant accounting guidance permitting varying approaches to 
value an asset that is left to management’s judgment). 
298 See, e.g., Tsereteli v. Res. Asset Securitization Tr., 692 F. Supp. 2d 387, 
393 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing valuations that are not in conformity with 
standard valuation guidelines are not actionable without more quantification 
of the impact); Fulton Cty., 2010 WL 5095294, at *8 (discussing plaintiff failing 
to show impact of the valuation flaws identified and whether it is comparable 
to the actual write-off the issuer took). 
299 See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., 720 
F. Supp. 2d 254, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (offering materials disclosed risks because 
of lack of historical data); Barclays, 2011 WL 31548, at *8 (offering materials 
disclosing risks). 
300 Supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
301 See generally In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
302 Id. at 482, 492. The view that stock analysts may be conflicted or provide poor 
advice is not a new one. In Benjamin Graham’s seminal work, The Intelligent 
Investor, he notes that “many of them are compelled to analyze with one eye on the 
stock ticker—a pose not conducive to sound thinking or worthwhile conclusions.” 
BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR, 264–65 (revised ed. 2006). 
303 Salomon, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 483. 
304 Id. at 485. 
305 Id. at 493. 
306 Id. at 492. 
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degree of volatility, suitable only for investors/traders ... that can 
withstand material losses.”307 
The court described the reports as “detailed, transparent, and 
primarily based on the companies’ own public statements, such 
as press releases, financial statements, and analyst calls.”308 The 
court implicitly suggested that this transparency permits investors 
to draw their own conclusions or compare the reports to other 
market information. The court observed that the plaintiffs failed 
to show that the valuation models in the reports were “false or 
objectively unreasonable[.]”309 
The Salomon plaintiffs also argued that other valuation models 
at the analyst’s firm assigned substantially lower valuations than 
the analyst’s own work that was addressed in a subsequent court 
decision.310 The court rejected the argument: 
In contrast to ... objective statements, financial valuation mod-
els depend so heavily on the discretionary choices of the mod-
eler ... choice of assumptions ... and choice of “comparables” 
that the resulting models and their predictions can only fairly 
be characterized as subjective opinions. Like other opinions, 
some valuation models may be more or less reliable than other 
models, have more or less predictive power, or hew more or less 
closely to conventional wisdom on a subject, but they are none-
theless opinions and not objective facts. An analyst who sets 
out his own opinion of a stock’s value based on the valuation 
model he finds most persuasive for that company does not omit 
a material fact by failing to note that others might have differ-
ent opinions[.] 311 
                                                                                                                         
307 Id. at 490–91. 
308 Id. at 491; see also Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 679 
F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that the red flags identified by plaintiffs were 
public, concluding therefore that the defendant’s “[stock] price would at all per-
tinent times have reflected the need for, if any, or culpable failure to undertake, 
if any, interim impairment testing.”). 
309 Salomon, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 491. 
310 See In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 248, 351–52 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
311 Id. at 251–52. The recent Supreme Court decision, Janus Capital Group 
v. First Derivative Traders, may foreclose this type of suit in the future. See Janus 
Cap. Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 140–43 (2011). The Court 
has read into Janus the requirement that the maker of a fraudulent statement 
be authorized to speak on behalf of the entity that the investor relied. Id. For a 
critique of the approach the Court took, see William A. Birdthistle, The Supreme 
Court’s Theory of the Fund, 37 J. CORP. L. 771, 775–85 (2012). 
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Although not involving valuation issues, the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers’ District Council Con-
struction Industry Pension Fund illustrates that liability for mis-
representations in fraud cases extends beyond whether the 
speaker did not believe a stated opinion.312 In Omnicare, the Su-
preme Court provided hypothetical situations of an issuer’s opin-
ion of its compliance that could rise to the level of fraud under the 
securities laws: 
Consider an unadorned statement of opinion about legal com-
pliance: “We believe our conduct is lawful.” If the issuer makes 
that statement without having consulted a lawyer, it could be 
misleadingly incomplete. In the context of the securities market, 
an investor, though recognizing that legal opinions can prove 
wrong in the end, still likely expects such an assertion to rest 
on some meaningful legal inquiry .... Similarly, if the issuer made 
the statement in the face of its lawyers’ contrary advice, or with 
knowledge that the Federal Government was taking the oppo-
site view, the investor again has cause to complain: He expects 
not just that the issuer believes the opinion (however irration-
ally), but that it fairly aligns with the information in the issuer’s 
possession at the time.313 
Because the alleged misstatements in Omnicare were made in 
a registration statement, the Court focused on the context of an 
opinion in such a document, noting “[i]nvestors do not ... expect 
opinions contained in those statements to reflect baseless, off-the-
cuff judgments, of the kind that an individual might communicate 
in daily life.”314 Similarly, investors expect an adviser’s pronounce-
ment on the value of an investment to be much more than an off-
the-cuff judgment. 
Some cases decided prior to Omnicare have followed this ap-
proach. In Allstate, the court recognized three possible areas of 
liability for opinion statements involving “expectations, beliefs, or 
                                                                                                                         
312 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers’ Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1323–24 (2015). The alleged misrepresentations in Omnicare 
did not involve an investment adviser or the valuation of an asset. The plaintiff 
made allegations concerning an issuer’s registration statement, claiming that 
its business complied with federal laws. Subsequent events proved the issuer’s state-
ments were false and the plaintiff, who had purchased securities in the offering, 
sued under Section 11 of the Securities Act. Id. at 1324. 
313 Id. at 1328–29 (footnotes omitted). 
314 Id. at 1330. 
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projections[.]”315 In addition to situations where the party does 
not believe the opinion, liability could attach where “there was no 
reasonable basis for the belief” or if “the speaker is aware of un-
disclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the statement’s ac-
curacy.”316 These cases turn on whether red flags exist that the 
person making the valuation has awareness. For example, a district 
court decision in the Second Circuit addressed a claim asserting 
that certain mortgage-backed securities were overvalued and mark 
downs delayed.317 The court explained that because “valuations 
ordinarily involve questions of business judgment, courts gener-
ally decline to find securities fraud stemming from statements 
about valuations.”318 Although, when “parties maintain high val-
uations on [securities] in the face of red flags that the valuations 
are inaccurate, courts have sustained securities fraud claims.”319 
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
claim, it did so on other grounds—that plaintiff failed to plead loss 
causation adequately.320 Another court, dealing with a fact pattern 
involving an investment adviser, rejected the view that valuations 
are opinions when they are alleged to be part of a larger fraudu-
lent scheme: 
                                                                                                                         
315 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Robert W. Baird & Co., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 
1132 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
316 Id. (citing Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 
MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P., 761 F.3d 
1109, 1115–16 (“At common law today it is sometimes possible to pursue mis-
representation claims against fiduciaries and those who hold themselves out as 
experts when they offer opinions that lack an objectively reasonable basis .... 
[S]ome wonder whether this approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
teachings. As the defendants note, Virginia Bankshares seemed to endorse the 
subjective disbelief/objective falsity test[.]”). Notably, the Tenth Circuit de-
cided MHC prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare. 
317 See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 784 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376, 391 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
318 Id. at 387. 
319 Id.; see also Gosselin v. First Tr. Advisors L.P., No. 08 C 5213, 2009 WL 
5064295, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2009); In re Flag Telecom Holdings Ltd. Sec. 
Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 429, 453–54, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Van Wagoner 
Funds, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
320 Stratte-McClure, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 390–91. Private plaintiffs alleging 
violations under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act must prove loss 
causation—the “causal link between the alleged misconduct and the economic 
harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff.” Emergent Cap. Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. 
Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that 
support an inference that Defendants’ valuation assessments were 
a part of a fraudulent scheme. Defendants argue that valuation 
cannot be the basis of a fraud claim because the valuation is “an 
exercise in discretionary business judgment involving consider-
ation of a variety of factors.” However, Plaintiffs are not merely 
contending Defendants did a poor job in making the valuation 
assessments. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants purpose-
fully did the valuation assessments so as to conceal Defendants’ 
misconduct and increase fees.321 
Cases exploring red flags often look to a number of objective 
factors underlying the issuer of the securities. For example, in 
Van Wagoner Funds, the court’s focus was on various events that 
impaired the value of a mutual fund’s holding of issuer’s restricted 
stock.322 The Van Wagoner plaintiffs sued the fund’s auditor, who 
accepted the fund’s valuation of the securities at cost.323 Accord-
ing to the plaintiffs’ theory, the auditor was aware of a number of 
negative events that affected the value of the issuer’s securities, 
including a withdrawn public offering, the issuer’s bankruptcy, 
change of business plans, announcement of layoffs, and generally 
worsening business conditions.324 However, the court ultimately re-
jected the plaintiffs’ claims because “valuation policies were public, 
as well as all adverse information about the restricted securities 
in which Van Wagoner Funds had invested, the [investors] have not 
alleged that [the auditor] concealed any facts from its investors.”325 
In Flag Telecom Holdings, plaintiffs alleged that a publicly traded 
company overvalued its trans-Atlantic fiber-optic cable until the 
company entered bankruptcy and the prior management left.326 
Plaintiffs contended that Flag was in a position to mark down the 
value of the asset well before the bankruptcy because: (a) prices 
                                                                                                                         
321 Gosselin, 2009 WL 5064295, at *5 (citations omitted). 
322 In re Van Wagoner, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1181. The Commission also brought 
an enforcement matter against the adviser, which is discussed in note 92. 
323 In re Van Wagoner, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1181. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. at 1182. Courts have applied similar logic in other valuation contexts. 
See, e.g., Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 679 F.3d 64, 69 (2d 
Cir. 2012); In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477, 491 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
326 In re Flag Telecom Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 429, 436, 
439, 442–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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for usage on the cable declined by 70 percent annually from 1999–
2001; (b) the company consistently missed sales targets on the 
route by 80–90 percent; (c) an executive commented that demand 
had “imploded”; and (d) the company utilized “improper reciprocal 
transactions” to prop up the value of the cable.327 The Flag plain-
tiffs’ relevant allegations withstood a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim.328 
While not specifically addressing valuations, courts have also 
explored the issue of when projections, which often form a basis 
of fair value estimates, can be actionable.329 One key consideration 
is whether the assumptions in a projection are completely inaccu-
rate. For example, the Allstate case involved a municipal bond is-
suance to fund the construction of an event facility.330 Payment of 
the bonds was to be funded in part from the revenue stream the 
facility would generate.331 Projections in the official statements 
showed that the revenue streams were sufficient to meet bond ob-
ligations.332 However, the projections were based on surveys of 
communities that were four times the size of the metropolitan area 
where the facility was being built.333 The defendants commis-
sioned, “or were at least aware of,” two other studies—which were 
not disseminated to investors—which surveyed communities more 
similar in size to the facility’s area and showed a lower revenue 
                                                                                                                         
327 Id. at 465. 
328 Id. at 469. 
329 There are also specific securities rules and regulations governing projec-
tions outside the context of investment advisers that are similar to case law 
and the Omnicare approach. For example, Rule 3b-6 of the Exchange Act and 
Rule 175 of the Securities Act provide a safe harbor for issuers providing pro-
jections in certain filings “unless it is shown that such statement was made or 
reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith.” 17 
C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(a) (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (2014). Item 10(b)(1) of Reg-
ulation S-K, which discusses projections in issuer filings, requires management to 
have “a reasonable basis” for the projection. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(1) (2014). 
Some provisions may go beyond the case law. For example, Item 10(b)(3) also rec-
ommends that if projections are included in a filing, “the disclosures accompa-
nying the projections should facilitate investor understanding of the basis for and 
limitations of projections.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3) (2014). 
330 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Robert W. Baird & Co., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 
1122 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
331 Id. at 1123. 
332 Id. at 1124. 
333 Id. at 1125. 
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stream.334 The Allstate court reasoned that since the projections 
were based on “objectively verifiable demographic data, a fact-finder 
could conclude with reasonable certainty that the [facility] would 
be unable to generate” the events and attendees projected in the 
offering statements.335  
B. Commission Litigation Involving Valuation Issues 
The Commission cases in federal courts involving valuation is-
sues generally involve scenarios where the investment adviser’s 
conduct is more akin to furthering a fraudulent enterprise.336 The 
Commission, like private plaintiffs, faces high hurdles in litigation 
involving the antifraud provisions.337 As a result, Commission ac-
tions tend to focus on fairly egregious conduct. For example, in 
SEC v. Lauer, the primary defendant orchestrated a manipulation 
of stock prices in order to inflate the value of private funds he 
managed.338 Among his fraudulent actions, Lauer purchased large 
                                                                                                                         
334 Id. at 1124–25. 
335 Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). 
336 More recently, the Commission has generally moved toward bringing en-
forcement actions through administrative proceedings rather than federal courts. 
For an interesting view of the phenomenon, see Susan D. Resley, Dealing With 
The SEC’s Administrative Proceeding Trends, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2015), http:// 
www.law360.com/articles/610688/dealing-with-the-sec-s-administrative-proceed 
ing-trend [https://perma.cc/YGE8-TDNH]. However, some administrative re-
spondents have begun challenging the growing use of administrative proceedings 
on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304–05 
(N.D. Ga. 2015). Litigation in this area is ongoing although challengers have 
faced recent setbacks in their claims. See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 
285–86 (2d Cir. 2016). The Commission has rejected constitutional challenges 
and the D.C. Circuit has upheld the Commission’s decision in one matter. See, 
e.g., In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 75837, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 4190, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,806 
(Sept. 3, 2015), 2015 WL 5172953, aff’d Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC, 
Slip Op., 2016 WL 4191191 (DC Cir., Aug. 9, 2016). In addition, the Commis-
sion has amended its rules of practice. See Amendments to the Commission’s 
Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319 (July 13, 2016), https:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A82-NB7Y]. 
337 See supra note 280 for a discussion on this issue. 
338 SEC v. Lauer, No. 03-80612-CIV, 2008 WL 4372896, at *12–13 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 24, 2008). Another example of egregious conduct that settled is SEC v. 
ICP Asset Management, LLC, which involved an adviser who sold CDOs in a 
manner that made certain clients overpay for them, accruing excessive fees to 
the advisory firm, and shielding other clients from losses. See ICP Asset Manage-
ment, LLC, Litigation Release No. 22477, 104 SEC Docket 1, 2012 WL 3986214 
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amounts of the stock of shell companies with no operations, driving 
the price of the shares upward.339 In one acquisition of $750,000, he 
claimed the investment’s value at $70 million.340 Without these 
transactions, the value of the private funds Lauer managed “would 
have plunged.”341 The Court concluded that the manipulation al-
lowed Lauer “to obtain illegally tens of million[s] of dollars in fees 
by materially overstating” the valuation.342 
The primary defendant in Lauer had at least two potential jus-
tifications for these valuations. The private funds’ manager had 
the “discretion to value securities as ... reasonably determined when 
they believed that the security did not represent its market 
value.”343 The private funds’ board had no input in the process.344 
In addition, Lauer retained a third party to provide valuations of 
the funds’ holdings that supported the inflated values.345 However, 
the egregiousness of the conduct to manipulate the stock prices of 
the portfolio companies undermined these potential justifications.346 
The Court also spent time critiquing the valuation reports, noting, 
for example, that they did not follow standard appraisal practices 
and utilized baseless and unrealistic projections.347 In short, the 
court found Lauer’s valuations were unreasonably contrary to dis-
closed valuation methods.348 
                                                                                                                         
(Sept. 10, 2012); Complaint, SEC v. ICP Asset Mgmt., No. 10-CIV-4791 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed June 21, 2010). For other examples, see Complaint, SEC v. Davis, No. 3:16-
CV-00285 (W.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) (settled matter alleging failure to mark 
down value of defaulted loans in private fund portfolio); Complaint, SEC v. 
Summit Asset Strategies, No. 2:15-CV-01429 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 4, 2015); SEC 
Charges Seattle Area Hedge Fund Adviser with Taking Unearned Manage-
ment Fees, Litigation Release No. 23334 (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov 
/litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23334.htm [https://perma.cc/9SDT-CW57] (filed as 
settled matter); SEC v. Balboa, No. 11 Civ. 8731(PAC), 2015 WL 4092328 
(S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015); see also In re Gilles T. De Charsonville, Exchange Act 
Release No. 77,937, 2016 WL 3030885 (May 26, 2016). 
339 Lauer, 2008 WL 4372896, at *12. 
340 Id. at *15. 
341 Id. at *19. 
342 Id. 
343 Id. at *5. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. at *6, *16. 
346 Id. at *25. 
347 Id. at *16. The court also described Lauer’s own view of these valuation 
reports as “very creative.” Id. 
348 Id. 
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Other cases do attempt to address an adviser’s valuation proce-
dures and methodology. For example, Rockies Fund, Inc. v. SEC 
(which arose out of an appeal of an administrative decision) in-
volved a business development company—a type of unregistered 
closed-end investment company—which failed to disclose that it 
held restricted shares of an issuer in its portfolio.349 As a result, the 
shares were valued as if they were free-trading shares.350 However, 
the company’s valuation policy required it to discount restricted 
shares.351 Under these facts, the court upheld the Commission’s 
decision and found violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of 
the Exchange Act.352 
Valuation cases that scrutinize the adviser’s valuation method-
ology have proven more challenging, even with Section 206(2) of 
the Advisers Act as a tool. For example, SEC v. Mannion provides 
an illustration of the difficulties in bringing such cases when there 
is some ambiguity—and the possibility of a court viewing the val-
uation as a subjective opinion.353 Mannion involved an adviser 
that managed a private fund, which invested in illiquid and high-
risk securities.354 The largest investment in the fund involved a 
distressed publicly traded issuer.355 In addition to holding com-
mon stock, the fund extended a bridge loan to the company after 
its bank cut off financial support.356 The fund also held convertible 
debentures of the issuer.357 Unsurprisingly, the condition of this 
company deteriorated.358 The Commission’s allegations included 
claims that the securities holdings’ values were inflated, resulting 
in the adviser receiving excessive management fees.359 
Like Lauer, the private placement memorandum of the fund in 
Mannion disclosed that the adviser had a great deal of discretion. 
                                                                                                                         
349 Rockies Fund, Inc. v. SEC, 428 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
350 “Free-trading stock” refers to shares that can be traded without any lim-
itation. See Finnerty, supra note 36; Van Vleet & Gerber, supra note 36.  
351 Rockies Fund, Inc., 428 F.3d at 1092.  
352 Id. at 1098.  
353 SEC v. Mannion, No. 1:10-CV-3374-WSD, 2013 WL 1291621, at *8 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 25, 2013). 
354 Id. at *2.  
355 Id. at *2–3. 
356 Id. at *3 (noting that the lender cut off financial support because the CEO 
abruptly resigned, and the board announced an investigation into possible wrong-
doing at the company). 
357 Id. at *2. 
358 Id. at *3. 
359 Id. at *1. 
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The adviser could adjust the value of illiquid securities to reflect 
“fair value,” which could be “significantly higher or lower” than the 
actual value of the investment.360 The Commission used an expert to 
argue that the holdings were overvalued.361 The expert opined that 
the restricted stock holdings were overvalued by at least $1.7 million, 
but did “not offer an opinion on the extent to which the convertible 
debentures and bridge loans should have been discounted.”362 
The expert’s inability to determine the amount of inflation in 
the securities’ value proved detrimental to the case. On a motion 
for summary judgment, the court concluded that without such an 
estimate, it was impossible to prove that the inflated value was a 
material misrepresentation for purposes of the antifraud provi-
sions in Section 206 of the Advisers Act and Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.363 The court did uphold the claim 
on the restricted stock, because the expert did opine on the 
amount of overvaluation.364 However, the court cast some doubt 
on the strength of the Commission’s case, noting that the over-
valuation occurred in one month, and that the excessive manage-
ment fee collected amounted to $2,107, 11 percent of the fees 
collected in the vehicle that held the investment “and a much 
smaller share of Defendants’ overall fees for 2005.”365 After losing 
on a motion for rehearing,366 the Commission filed a motion to 
dismiss the valuation claim entirely, and the Commission settled 
the matter over other conduct related to misappropriation. 367 
                                                                                                                         
360 Id. at *3. 
361 Id. at *4. 
362 Id. The defense, coincidentally, also utilized an expert to justify the val-
uations. Id. at *6. 
363 Id. at *14. 
364 Id. at *10, *12. 
365 Id. at *12. The court also rejected the Commission’s Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 claim because it found that the overvaluations were not in connection 
with any securities transactions. Id. at *11. The Commission could not show that 
anyone who later invested in the private funds received the inflated value. Id. 
366 See id. at *5. 
367 See SEC v. Mannion, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2014). The 
Commission filed a similar action against Yorkville Advisors, LLC, which alleged 
that certain investments of convertible debentures, convertible preferred stock, 
and promissory notes in Yorkville managed private funds carried inflated values. 
See Complaint, SEC v. Yorkville Advisors, LLC, No. 12-CV-7728 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 
2012). The case is not resolved, although the Commission has survived a Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See SEC v. Yorkville Ad-
visors, LLC, No. 12-CV-7728 (GBD) 2013 WL 3989054, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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This outcome is not dissimilar to some private litigations dis-
cussed earlier.368 
Valuation issues have periodically arisen in matters outside the 
context of investment advisers, business development companies, 
or related entities in SEC litigation. Generally, cases outside the 
adviser sector involve misvaluation as part of other broader, fraud-
ulent conduct, such as an offering or accounting fraud.369 The prop-
ositions in these cases also provide guides on both the potential 
avenues and limits of cases grounded in valuation claims.370 
Values derived from projections are also a subject of litiga-
tion.371 One court has suggested that empirical evidence that is 
inconsistent with a projection can serve as a basis for an action.372 
In SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings Corp., a case concerning offering 
fraud, a company’s projections of future performance were deemed 
misleading when past performance—which was not disclosed to 
investors—was inconsistent with the projection.373 Generalized 
disclaimers that a projection was a forward-looking statement that 
may not come to fruition did not immunize the issuer from liability 
in Tecumseh. 374  Consistent with other private litigations, the 
court in SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC supported the proposition 
that projections must be modified when subsequent events do not 
bear out the initial projection.375 Thus, when a projection that was 
                                                                                                                         
368 See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
369 See, e.g., SEC v. Merchant Cap., LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 2003); SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings 
Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
370 See, e.g., Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 771, 772; Ponce, 345 F.3d at 741; 
Tecumseh Holdings Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 344, 356. 
371 See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
372 Tecumseh Holdings Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
373 Id. at 352–54. 
374 See id. at 350 (citing In re Time Warner Secs. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 266 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (proposing that projections are “not beyond the reach of the securi-
ties laws”)). 
375 See, e.g., Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 767–68; Hekker v. Ideon Grp., Inc., 
No. 95-681-Civ-J-16, 1996 WL 578335, at *1, *6 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 19, 1996). 
Merchant Capital also addressed disclaimers in the projections: “What may once 
have been a good faith projection became, with experience, a materially mis-
leading omission of material fact. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, ‘[t]o warn 
that the untoward may occur when the event is contingent is prudent, to cau-
tion that it is only possible for the unfavorable events to happen when they 
have already is deceit.’” Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 769. 
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made in good faith initially does not appear to be achievable be-
cause of subsequent events, continued affirmation of the projection 
is actionable.376 
Another case arising out of an appeal of an agency administra-
tive decision, Ponce v. SEC, touched on accounting for an issuer’s 
assets in a financial statement.377 In Ponce, an accountant provided 
valuations for certain licenses and tooling that was reported in an 
issuer’s financial statements.378 He valued the licenses based on 
restricted shares another party exchanged to acquire the licenses.379 
Although he valued the restricted shares at a discount—about $4.7 
million—the accountant was aware that the issuer later purchased 
the licenses for a substantially lower amount—about $125,000.380 
The accountant also treated tooling of a prototype as an asset rather 
than an expense, contrary to accounting guidance, further inflating 
the value of the issuer.381 
The accountant in Ponce attempted to argue that his certifica-
tion of the issuer’s financial statements did not violate Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.382 In particular, he noted 
that his valuation methods were disclosed in the footnotes to the 
financial statements.383 Although the court discussed that the val-
uation methodology was flawed,384 it focused on the accountant’s 
own doubts that the valuation was accurate. Among other things, 
the court noted the accountant “was fully aware of the problems 
associated with the valuation method he used,” but “he nonethe-
less did not alter the valuation.”385 The accountant also admitted 
he had “reservations” about his valuation of the licenses, and he “be-
lieved [the issuer] could not sell them for the assigned value.”386 
                                                                                                                         
376 Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 769. 
377 Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 727–28, 731–32 (9th Cir. 2003). 
378 Id. at 726. 
379 Id. at 730.  
380 Id. at 726–27. 
381 Id. at 727. 
382 Id. at 729–30. 
383 Id. at 730.  
384 Id. at 731. The accountant’s value was premised on the value of the stock 
on the date the licenses were initially acquired in a reverse merger transaction. 
Id. However, the court observed that the stock was “thinly traded.” Id. After 
the purchase, the issuer acquired the shares for substantially less, casting sig-
nificant doubt of the accountant’s valuation method. Id. 
385 Id. 
386 Id. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING COURT APPROACHES TO VALUATION 
AND ALTERNATIVES 
A. Court Review of Valuation Disputes and the Business  
Judgment Rule 
As the case law demonstrates, courts have grappled with dis-
putes involving valuation matters by treating an adviser’s value 
as a subjective opinion.387 The approach of treating valuation in 
fraud cases as opinions provides a layer of deference to an ad-
viser’s valuation determination.388 As a result, it should be no sur-
prise that the successful valuation cases pursued in federal courts 
represent situations of fundamental breakdowns where the ad-
viser is effectively operating a fraudulent enterprise or simply 
fails to undertake the valuation process represented to clients and 
investors.389 Further, while certain valuation protocols—through 
statutory and rule-based requirements—are in place for regis-
tered funds, allowing for more scrutiny of the valuation process, 
no such guideposts exist for private fund investors.390 
The courts’ approach, however, often seems disconnected to 
the process-driven approach in many Commission actions. Rather 
than focus on the adviser’s process in arriving at a valuation, 
courts tend to defer to the adviser as a valuation expert.391 On its 
surface, this seems reasonable since an adviser’s primary function 
is to identify investments that will ultimately appreciate. However, 
significant implications follow from an adviser’s valuation deter-
mination, because the valuation sets out whether the client profits 
from the investment and how much compensation the adviser is 
entitled.392 A lack of scrutiny offers room for abuse. 
                                                                                                                         
387 Notably, the threshold issue of whether an opinion is a fraudulent state-
ment in securities law appears in numerous other contexts. See Wendy Gerwick 
Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 381, 386 (2013). 
Valuations bear some distinction because of the central role of investment advisers 
in that process and the various statutes and rules governing valuations. Id. 
388 Id. at 386–87. 
389 See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 87. 
390 See, e.g., Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a) (2012). 
391 See, e.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(calculations of goodwill depend on management’s judgment). 
392 See, e.g., Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 5847, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶72,135 (1969) (finding val-
uation is “critically important” and determines investment managers’ salaries). 
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Court deference in this area can be better understood by the 
challenge of assigning a value to complex or illiquid securities. 
Determining the value of a portfolio of large, liquid stock traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange is a relatively straightforward 
exercise. Alternatively, determining the value of restricted stock, 
complex derivative products, or a collection of other hard-to-value 
assets, involves an element of subjectivity that creates a range of 
possible values that often rely on the judgment of the adviser.393 
A client who contracts with an adviser relies on the adviser’s skill in 
assessing a value as it is set out in the investment contract. Argu-
ably, a court may be poorly placed to step into the adviser’s shoes 
and make a post hoc judgment on the appropriate value of a hard-
to-value security.394 
The case treatment of valuation issues has a common law an-
alog for corporate decision making.395 The business judgment rule 
provides “a shield to protect directors from liability for their deci-
sions.”396 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained, the business 
judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business deci-
sion the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interest of the company.”397 One commentator has described 
the business judgment rule as a “doctrine of abstention” that gen-
erally directs courts from refraining from reviewing a board’s de-
cisions “unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.”398 
The deferential judicial review of board decisions has policy 
justifications. Judge Winter summed them up in Joy v. North: 
First, shareholders to a very real degree voluntarily under-
take the risk of bad business judgment. Investors need not buy 
                                                                                                                         
393 See, e.g., Fait, 655 F.3d at 108–11 (stating that there is no objective stan-
dard for determining the market value of assets). 
394 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts recog-
nize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corpo-
rate business decisions.”). 
395 See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties 
in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of 
Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1030–32 (2005) (noting that courts 
have come to view mutual funds as corporations, but argues this is inappropriate). 
396 Gries Sports Enterprises Inc. v. Clev. Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 
N.E.2d 959, 963–64 (Ohio 1984). 
397 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
398 Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 87. 
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stock, for investment markets offer an array of opportunities 
less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers. 
Nor need investors buy stock in particular corporations. In the 
exercise in what is genuinely a free choice, the quality of a firm’s 
management is often decisive and information is available from 
professional advisors. Since shareholders can and do select 
among investments partly on the basis of management, the 
business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain voluntari-
ness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions. 
Second, courts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a 
most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions. 
The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not 
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business 
imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on 
less than perfect information. The entrepreneur’s function is to 
encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned 
decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years 
later against a background of perfect knowledge. 
Third, because potential profit often corresponds to the po-
tential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that 
law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate deci-
sions. Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very 
substantial losses, while the alternatives offer less risk of loss 
but also less potential profit.... Given mutual funds and similar 
forms of diversified investment, courts need not bend over 
backwards to give special protection to shareholders who re-
fuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diversifying. A rule 
which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives 
thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.399  
Judge Winter’s policy considerations for the business judgment 
rule400 can handily be used as a rationale for the current court 
                                                                                                                         
399 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982). 
400 Other commenters have provided similar descriptions of the fundamental 
rationale for the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Todd M. Aman, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique in Light of the Financial 
Meltdown, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1, 11–20 (2010–11); Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 88–
90; Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment 
Rule in Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1083–93 (2009); Richard Scarborough 
& Richard Olderman, Why Does the FDIC Sue Bank Officers? Exploring the 
Boundaries of the Business Judgment Rule in the Wake of the Great Recession, 20 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 372–75 (2015); Robert Sprague & Aaron J. 
Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for 
Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., 1, 8–12 (2010). Andrew 
Gold has framed the business judgment rule as an institutional choice against 
judicial intervention because of the uncertain benefits of higher court scrutiny. 
See Andrew Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: 
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treatment of valuation disputes, especially in the context of private 
funds invested in illiquid securities. The Investment Company Act 
limits the pool of investors eligible to subscribe to private funds 
based on a minimum asset threshold or the number of investors.401 
The rationale is that such individuals can better withstand more 
risky investments and that they may be more sophisticated—and 
better equipped—to evaluate the merits of such an investment.402 
Further, the challenge of valuing an illiquid security creates a 
greater possibility of variation because information is imperfect. 
In the absence of tangible market data, there is greater reliance on 
modeling techniques and values of analogous securities.403 Rather 
than creating a definitive price, a valuation under these circum-
stances may fall within a reasonable range of values—consistent 
with the Court’s view of valuations in Virginia Bankshares.404 
There are generalized critiques of the business judgment rule 
and arguments, 405 more particularly, that investment advisers and 
                                                                                                                         
Reflecting on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 
398, 470–74 (2007). 
401 Two provisions are commonly relied upon by funds to avoid the obliga-
tions under the Investment Company Act. Section 80a-3(c)(1) allows a fund to 
avoid these obligations if there are no more than 100 investors in the fund. See 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). Alternatively, an unlimited number of qualified investors 
can participate in a private fund. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). The term “quali-
fied investor” provides various eligibility standards to participate in private 
funds, such as a requirement that an individual hold $5 million in investments. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(51)(A). In addition, other limited exceptions may allow 
certain persons to participate in such funds without meeting the requirements 
of being a qualified investor. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-5 (2012) (allowing 
certain knowledgeable employees of the adviser and others to invest). Other 
restrictions on the pool of private fund investors exist by virtue of the require-
ments to avoid registration obligations under the Securities Act. See Sklar, su-
pra note 205, at 3278–79.  
402 Tamar Frankel’s survey of Ponzi scheme victims and perpetrators sug-
gests that wealthy and highly educated individuals also fall prey to such 
schemes despite legal assumptions that they are better equipped to assess com-
plex investments. See TAMAR FRANKEL, THE PONZI SCHEME PUZZLE 143–45 
(2012); see also The Madoff affair: Con of the century, ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 
2008) http://www.economist.com/node/12818310/ [http://perma.cc/XG8V-KHMC] 
[hereinafter Madoff Affair]. 
403 See, e.g., In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477, 491 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
404 501 U.S. 1083, 1092–94 (1991). 
405 See, e.g., Aman, supra note 400; Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control 
and the Need for Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541 
(2010); Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 400; see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The 
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investment companies should not be treated in a similar fashion as 
other corporations.406 Some commenters propose greater judicial 
scrutiny of board actions for all corporations in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis.407 In the context of valuations, a business 
judgment rule-like approach that adheres closely to Virginia 
Bankshares and Omnicare introduces an element of caveat emptor 
for the advisory client to evaluate an investment opportunity.408 
Indeed, from the investor’s perspective, penetrating an adviser’s val-
uation in a private fund may be like attempting to peer into a black 
box. Moreover, private fund investors themselves, which often rep-
resent the interests of retirees, charitable organizations, and other 
financially unsophisticated individuals, are vulnerable to invest-
ment frauds.409 In the wake of many recent financial frauds, some 
critics argue that financial regulators did not do enough to protect 
investors in private funds.410 
                                                                                                                         
Demythification of the Board of Directors, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 131, 195–96, n.314 
(2015) (not critiquing the business judgment rule, but suggesting it as a possi-
ble catalyst for changes in corporate governance if courts applied it in a more 
intrusive fashion). 
406 See, e.g., Birdthistle, supra note 311, at 787–90; Langevoort, supra note 
395, at 1032–40. 
407 See, e.g., Aman, supra note 400, at 44 (“The business judgment rule no longer 
appears justified on cost-benefit grounds.”); see also John Armour & Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35 (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307959 [https://perma.cc 
/Q9QP-U78R] (arguing generally for enhanced corporate liability for risk-taking 
behavior). Cf. Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253 (2014) 
(arguing that an expanded legal duty concerning risk-taking administered by 
courts would be unwieldy). 
408 See generally Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. 1083; Omnicare v. Laborers’ Dist. 
Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015). 
409 See, e.g., Madoff Affair, supra note 402. 
410 See, e.g., Zelaya v. United States, No. 13-14780, 2015 WL 1402237 (11th 
Cir. Mar. 30, 2015) (Plaintiffs allege that the SEC’s investigation into Stanford 
Ponzi scheme was inordinately delayed). In a similar vein, other commenters 
have criticized the SEC for failing adequately to police private funds. See, e.g., 
J.W. Verret, Review: Is Hedge Fund Registration Necessary?, 70 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 705, 707–08 (2013) (critiquing regulatory response to Madoff and other 
frauds and suggesting this as a justification for questioning whether additional 
regulation in the field would better protect investors). An interesting point on 
this issue is whether there is a gap between expectations of government over-
sight in an area that was previously lightly regulated. One can view this as a 
form of government failure. See Barak Orbach, What is Government Failure?, 
30 YALE J. REG. ONLINE 44, 53–55 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2219709 [https://perma.cc/Q8H4-B7FG]. 
2016] OUTSIDE A BLACK BOX 61 
B. A Process-Driven Approach for Valuation Disputes 
One alternative to address valuation disputes in the private 
fund space could be to empower courts to vary their scrutiny of an 
adviser’s value of a portfolio security depending on the robustness 
of the adviser’s valuation procedures. For more robust procedures, 
a court would limit its review to confirming that the adviser followed 
the disclosed procedures.411 For more arbitrary procedures, such as 
a simple mandate to value securities based on the adviser’s good 
faith, courts could scrutinize the actual value the adviser assigned 
with other relevant factors to determine whether the valuation is 
accurate.412 This two-tier approach has an added benefit to incen-
tivize advisers to adopt more robust valuation procedures in order 
to avoid greater court scrutiny. Courts and advisers already have 
a reference point for robust valuation procedures from best prac-
tices guides in the private fund space413 and the valuation proce-
dures in the Investment Company Act for registered investment 
companies.414 At the same time, this approach frees advisers who 
                                                                                                                         
411 See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assos. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 351 (2010) (reviewing 
the board’s process to determine how adviser fees were set for claims involving 
Section 36(b) of the Investment Advisers Act). 
412 See, e.g., SEC v. Mannion, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2011) 
(finding the defendant’s good faith valuation efforts subject to further exami-
nation in Rule 10b-5 litigation); Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset 
Mmgt. LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 385, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (upholding good faith 
standard in the examination to specific organization valuation policies); In re 
Allied Capital Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3812(GEL), 2003 WL 1964184 at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003). 
413 See, e.g., Int’l. Org. of Sec. Commissions, Principles for the Valuation of 
Collective Investment Schemes: Final Report (May 2013), http://www.iosco.org 
/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD413.pdf [http://perma.cc/8J9N-QGNF]; Hedge 
Fund Standards Board, The Hedge Fund Standards (May 11, 2015), http:// www 
.hfsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hedge-Fund-Standards-as-at-November 
-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PLL-JE44]; Int’l. Org. of Sec. Commissions, Princi-
ples for the Valuation of Hedge Fund Portfolios: Final Report. (Nov. 2007), http:// 
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD253.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE9M 
-CRST]; Asset Managers’ Committee, Report of the Asset Managers’ Committee 
to the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Best Practices for the 
Hedge Fund Industry (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public 
/@swaps/documents/file/bestpractices.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP54-5DSN]; Alter-
native Investment Management Association, AIMA’s Guide to Sound Practices 
for Hedge Fund Valuation (Mar. 2007), https://www.aima.org/download.cfm/doc 
id/71F28FFC-C3C7-41A7-9B3490B58652DA3A [http://perma.cc/L7EF-BQNJ].  
414 For example, courts could look to the Commission’s guidance over certain 
types of hard-to-value securities in Accounting Series Releases 113 and 118. 
Supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text. 
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wish not to adopt such valuation practices to do so.415 However, 
this proposed judicial approach requires a reinterpretation of the 
antifraud provisions and the creation of new substantive rights at 
least with respect to private claims.416 Such modifications could 
be limited to rights either for the Commission to enforce or could 
be broadened to form a private right of action. 
There are analogs that are suggestive of how courts could pro-
ceed under such an approach. Under Delaware corporate law, courts 
sometimes do not apply the business judgment rule in cases in-
volving tender offers and other corporate takeover scenarios. In 
those situations, courts and commenters have recognized the possi-
bility that a corporation’s board of directors may have inherent con-
flicts of interest concerning a potential takeover, particularly in the 
context of competing bids.417 Because of this conflict, Delaware 
courts scrutinize board decisions more rigorously than the busi-
ness judgment rule depending on the circumstances.418 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. provides an 
example of the Delaware courts’ heightened scrutiny.419 In Revlon, 
a firm made an unsolicited tender offer to acquire Revlon.420 After 
                                                                                                                         
415 See supra notes 34–42. 
416 Some antifraud statutes available to Commission enforcement actions 
do not require scienter as an element. In such cases, it is plausible for courts 
independently to determine that providing inaccurate valuations in the ab-
sence of an adviser’s intent or recklessness to provide such a violation could be 
a breach of fiduciary duty. In contrast, the scienter element of other antifraud 
statutes, such as Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, which are available to private 
parties, would require legislative and rule changes. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
417 See, e.g., Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1994); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Be-
cause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its 
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there 
is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold be-
fore the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.”); Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 769, 788–89 (2006). 
418 See Bainbridge, supra note 417, at 802–04 (providing an analysis of the 
types of situations when a heightened standard of review may apply to a cor-
porate takeover); see also Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 
1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1990). 
419 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Revlon decision is a variant of heightened scru-
tiny involving defensive measures to prevent a hostile takeover. Id. Another 
formulation is expressed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d. 946 
(Del. 1985). 
420 506 A.2d at 176. 
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taking a number of defensive measures to repel the offer, Revlon’s 
board authorized the company to conduct negotiations with other 
potential bidders.421  A white knight merger proposal emerged 
from a friendly party that was slightly more attractive than the 
initial tender offer.422 The proposal had a lockup provision that 
precluded Revlon from considering other competing offers, effec-
tively precluding the firm that made an unsolicited tender offer 
to enhance the terms of its proposal.423 The Revlon court reviewed 
and upheld Revlon’s various defensive tactics prior to the white 
knight’s proposal.424 
However, the Revlon court took a different—and much less 
deferential—view of the lockup provision: 
The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to 
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recogni-
tion that the company was for sale. The duty of the board had 
thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate 
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for 
the stockholders’ benefit. This significantly altered the board’s 
responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced 
threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stock-
holders’ interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole 
question of defensive measures became moot. The directors’ 
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auc-
tioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders 
at a sale of the company.425 
The court invalidated the lockup provision.426 The slight price im-
provement in the white knight’s offer did not justify a provision 
that precluded continuing the auction for better bids.427 
                                                                                                                         
421 Id. at 177. 
422 Id. at 178. 
423 Id. 
424 Id. 180–81. 
425 Id. at 182. 
426 Id. at 184. 
427 Id. at 183–84. Commenters have often criticized Revlon for the potential 
breadth of a board’s duty in being an “auctioneer.” Delaware courts have sub-
sequently clarified the case and do not require a board to hold an outright open 
auction. See, e.g., Barkan v. Armsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 
1989) (noting that “no single blueprint” exists for a board to satisfy its obligations); 
Bainbridge, supra note 417, at 801–04; Franklin A. Gervutz, Removing Revlon, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwin-
dling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 190–91 (2014); Christina M. Sautter, 
Promises Made To Be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control 
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In situations where enhanced review is considered appropriate, 
Delaware courts focus on “the adequacy of the decision-making 
process employed by the directors” and, depending on the circum-
stances, conduct “a judicial examination of the reasonableness of 
the directors’ action in light of the circumstances then existing.”428 
This second step may be avoided when the board’s process was 
robust, and the board members who approved the transaction 
were disinterested.429 
Similar federal court scrutiny applies to registered investment 
companies. The Investment Company Act, for example, places a 
fiduciary duty on investment advisers “with respect to the receipt 
of compensation for services” paid by a registered investment com-
pany.430 Private plaintiffs as well as the Commission can bring 
actions431 and need not prove “personal misconduct” but rather 
must prove “a breach of fiduciary duty.”432 Courts have set a fairly 
high bar in bringing such cases—requiring a showing that an in-
vestment adviser “must charge a fee that is so disproportionately 
large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered 
and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”433 
In evaluating a claim, the Supreme Court acknowledged, “a mea-
sure of deference to a board’s judgment may be appropriate in some 
instances.”434 A key circumstance in determining the deference to 
                                                                                                                         
Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 942–43 (2013); Bernard S. Sharfman, 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization and its Implementation under Corporate 
Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 412 (2014). 
428 Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). 
429 See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009). 
See also Daniel J. Morrissey, M&A Fiduciary Duties: Delaware’s Murky Juris-
prudence, 58 VILL. L. REV. 121, 153–54 (2013) (discussing Lyondell). 
430 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2010). 
431 There has been a recent spate of private actions invoking Section 80a-35. 
These recent cases focus on two phenomena in the industry: the retention of the 
bulk of the management fees by an adviser when a sub-adviser performs most 
of the advisory function, and the question of whether an adviser is passing on 
the savings from economies of scale in retail funds relative to the fees institu-
tional clients pay. See Firms Fight Unprecedented Number of Excessive-Fee 
Suits, FT IGNITES (Apr. 2, 2015) http://ignites.com/c/1089403 /115363?referr 
_module=SearchSubFromIG&highlight=Firms%20Fight%20“Unprecedented” 
%20Number%20of%20Excessive-Fee%20Suits [https://perma.cc/83SB-PWQD]. 
432 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2010). 
433 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 
434 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 349 (2010). 
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afford a board’s decision to accept a fee arrangement turns on pro-
cess. When a board’s process is robust, “a reviewing court should 
afford commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining 
process.”435 However, “where the board’s process was deficient or 
the adviser withheld important information, the court must take 
a more rigorous look at the outcome.”436 
Commission enforcement action in the area of registered fund 
reviews of advisory contracts has focused more specifically on the 
process requirements in the Investment Company Act, typically 
referred to as the “15(c) process.”437 The Investment Company Act 
requires that the board of a registered investment company meet 
in person to conduct an annual review of the advisory contract.438 
A majority of independent directors must approve the contract.439 
Further, the directors have a duty to request and evaluate infor-
mation, and the adviser has a duty to furnish information reason-
ably necessary to evaluate the contract.440 The Commission has 
brought several settled administrative actions in this area that have 
typically focused on situations where the adviser allegedly failed 
to provide material information to a registered fund’s board.441 
Court scrutiny of valuation determinations in private funds 
based on the robustness of the adviser’s procedures has limitations. 
For situations when courts grant great deference, it still leaves the 
possibility that objectively inaccurate valuations would not be sub-
ject to court scrutiny. At the other end, courts may find themselves 
scrutinizing complex valuations for which they are ill-equipped to 
judge.442 In addition, developing a judicial benchmark for robust 
                                                                                                                         
435 Id. at 351. 
436 Id. at 336. 
437 See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2010). For cases 
covering this area, see supra note 434. 
438 See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c). 
439 See id. 
440 See id. 
441 See, e.g., In re Kornitzer Capital Mgmt., Inc., Investment Company Act 
Release No. 31560, 2015 WL 1800393 (Apr. 21, 2015) (settled matter); In re 
Chariot Advisors, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 3872, 2014 WL 2986899 
(July 3, 2014) (settled matter); In re Northern Lights Compliance Serv., LLC, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 30,502, 2013 WL 1835420 (May 2, 2013) 
(settled matter); In re Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Advisers Act Release 
No. 3315, 2011 WL 5562535 (Nov. 16, 2011) (settled matter).  
442 Courts have often struggled with valuation issues when questions arise 
with hard-to-value assets. For example, Delaware courts often struggle with 
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valuation procedures would require common law development, leav-
ing advisers with some uncertainty over the strength of their own 
valuation procedures. The Delaware common law and 15(c) process 
also address somewhat distinct issues as compared to private fund 
valuation practices. Both areas involve discrete events.443 Revlon 
situations occur during hostile corporate takeover attempts—a 
relatively rare event in a corporation’s life.444 The 15(c) process 
and the related fiduciary duty obligations of Section 36(b) is an 
annual event for the board of directors of registered investment 
companies.445 In contrast, valuation determinations may be a daily 
event for advisers.446 Elevated standards for valuation in this con-
text could make the process cumbersome and costly if courts become 
too aggressive in their review. 
Other possible alternatives exist to address valuations in private 
funds, but they may be much less desirable. For example, legislation 
and Commission rulemaking could establish valuation procedures 
not unlike those for registered investment companies.447 However, 
this rules-based approach may lack the flexibility to address issues 
unique to private funds or to change as the area evolves. Another 
approach is to address the issue of limited judicial review indirectly 
without changing the approach of the courts. For example, Congress 
                                                                                                                         
valuing minority shareholder stakes in situations where the shareholders are 
being squeezed out. See, e.g., Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 793 
A.2d 312, 315–16, 318 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 725 A.2d 
442 (1999); LeBeau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., 1999 WL 44993 at *6–7 (Del. Ch. 
1998), aff’d in part & remanded in part, 737 A.2d 513, 527 (Del. 1999). Such difficul-
ties appear in other contexts. For example, the Surface Transportation Board 
determines whether a railroad charges a monopolistic freight rate by develop-
ing a complicated economic model based on what a hypothetical stand-alone railroad 
would charge. Like the valuation cases involving advisers, the Board’s level of 
review was historically deferential to the railroad. See Salvatore Massa, Inject-
ing Competition in the Railroad Industry, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 19–22 (2000). 
443 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2010). 
444 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1990). 
445 Section 80a-15(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act limits the length of the 
advisory contract to two years, but nonetheless the contract may be continued if 
approved at least annually by the board or by vote of a majority of the outstanding 
voting securities. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (2010). 
446 The frequency of valuation can vary by the terms of a private fund’s of-
fering memorandum. In contrast, for open-end mutual funds, Rule 22c-1(b) re-
quires daily valuation of the current net asset value of the fund. Investment 
Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b). 
447 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-1(c). 
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and the Commission could further limit the pool of investors who 
may be eligible to participate in private funds. Under the current 
legal framework, private funds seek exemptions from registration 
under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act.448 In 
order to meet these exemptions, the previous funds must ensure that 
investors meeting certain criteria participate in the private fund. 
At a minimum, investors must meet the requirement of being ac-
credited investors,449 and, in many instances, the investor must 
meet the higher standard of being a qualified investor.450 These 
rules could be modified to target certain classes of investors who 
may be more severely impacted by a valuation dispute, such as pen-
sion funds.451 Beyond identifying perceived vulnerable groups, the 
rules could raise net worth requirements or alternatively limit the 
amount of assets any investor could place into a private fund to 
avoid situations where the investor is “all in” on one investment. 
Under this approach, limiting the pool of eligible investors cabins 
the adverse impact of limited judicial review on investors. 
                                                                                                                         
448 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), 80a-3(c)(7) (2010). 
449 Private funds operating under Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Com-
pany Act are limited to offering the fund to no more than 100 investors. See 
supra note 401. Beyond the limitation in the number of investors, such funds 
will seek an exemption to the registration requirements of the Securities Act. 
The Securities Act provides such an exemption for offerings to accredited in-
vestors. See id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2014). An “accredited investor” is defined 
under Rule 501(a) of Regulation D. Generally, for an individual to be an ac-
credited investor, he or she must have earned income that exceeds $200,000 
(or $300,000 together with a spouse) or must have a net worth of $1 million 
(excluding the value of the person’s residence). 
450 See supra note 417 for a discussion on the qualified investor concept. 
451 Section 413(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission to 
review the accredited investor standard. See Net Worth Standard for Accredited 
Investors, SEC Release No. 3144, Securities Act Release No. 9177, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3144, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,572, 
2011 WL 231559, at 4–5 (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011 
/33-9177.pdf [https://perma.cc/R24R-XPE7]. Recent views on this topic have con-
sidered creating exceptions to the accredited investor standard. For example, the 
Division of Corporation Finance issued a report on the accredited investor stan-
dard suggesting opening up the exemption to certain individuals, including all 
entities with investments in excess of $5 million. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM., 
REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR” (2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/reportspubs/special-studies/review-definition-of-ac 
credited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf [https:// perma.cc/836Y-7FL3]; see also Michael 
S. Piwowar, Capital Unbound: Remarks at the Cato Summit on Financial Regu-
lation (June 2, 2015) (transcript available at sec.gov), https://www.sec.gov 
/news/speech/capital-unbound-cato-summit.html#_ftnref9 [https://perma.cc/T4JM 
-UN2Y]. 
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However, such rules are a blunt tool to address the narrower 
issue of limited judicial review. They risk limiting access to pri-
vate funds to investors who are prepared to undertake the risks 
inherent in such investments, including limited judicial review. 
Like any possible detailed rules governing valuations, elaborate 
rules over the area may become obsolete as the characteristics of 
investors and private funds evolve.452 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An investment adviser’s valuation of assets for a client’s ac-
count or for a pooled investment vehicle is one of the most critical 
functions an adviser performs that impacts fees and the returns 
the investor has reaped. It is unsurprising that the federal secu-
rities laws have developed extensive guidance for registered in-
vestment companies. Aside from limited guidance for registered 
investment companies, the legal framework for these funds has 
focused on process-driven requirements rather than forming ob-
jective standards on how an adviser should value a security. The 
process-driven approach never determines whether a valuation is 
per se inaccurate, rather it looks to the process of how the adviser 
made the valuation decision. This approach recognizes the limita-
tions of regulators and courts in their ability to, on a de novo basis 
and with the benefit of hindsight, value a fund’s portfolio assets—
particularly hard-to-value securities. 
There are potential areas that could be developed further in the 
enforcement of federal securities laws. One area—Section 206(2) 
of the Advisers Act—could be further developed to address the scope 
of an adviser’s fiduciary duty over valuations. A second broader 
area is whether additional requirements and guidance over regis-
tered fund valuations should be utilized for private funds. Recent 
reforms in the federal securities laws moved toward convergence in 
adviser standards of conduct over registered investment companies 
and private funds.453 Continued convergence may not be desirable, 
                                                                                                                         
452 Tom Lin has observed that securities regulation has often approached 
investor protection by focusing on a homogenous concept for investors. See Tom 
C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 464–65 (2015). He argues 
for a heterogeneous approach to crafting investor protection policies, recognizing 
that the expectations of investors vary along several different factors. Id. He fo-
cuses particularly on the rise of algorithmic investors and the need for flexible 
principles based regulation because of the risk of regulatory obsolescence. Id. 
453 Convergence reflects a continuation of recent securities laws reforms 
that have required registration of many private fund advisers. Prior to the 
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however, because registered investment companies and private 
funds have different investment mandates. 
Unlike investors of mutual funds, investors of private funds 
stand on distinctly perilous ground. Although the Advisers Act pro-
vides some tangential requirements that affect valuations, success-
ful cases brought by regulators center on situations of outright 
fraud—often involving situations where the adviser misrepre-
sented their disclosed valuation procedures. Investors—who do not 
have standing to bring actions under the Advisers Act—must rely 
on antifraud concepts in federal courts. As a result, for private lit-
igants challenging an adviser’s valuation in federal court, opaque 
disclosed valuation procedures are likely to lead a court to defer to 
an adviser’s valuation. The private fund valuation becomes a black 
box—a mystery that the ultimate investor cannot penetrate.454 
To make matters worse, courts have elected to view valuation as 
opinions, providing advisers wide latitude in how they value secu-
rities. Although the opinion concept is expressed in these decisions, 
a better perspective of court treatment of adviser decisions is to 
view them like board decisions of a corporation and the concept of 
                                                                                                                         
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, many private fund advisers were exempt from registration and largely 
avoided the obligations of the Advisers Act with the exception of the antifraud 
provisions. See 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 275, 279). However, with only limited exception such advisers are now reg-
istered and subject to all of the obligations of the Advisers Act. See supra Sec-
tion I.B.1. Another example of convergence is the requirement for advisers and 
registered investment companies to develop policies and procedures that are 
implemented together and complement each other. See 68 Fed. Reg. 72, 714 
(Dec. 24, 2003) (request for comment 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275, 279). 
454 Although one could argue that the lack of transparency is the argument 
for investors not to participate in such funds, fees and performance may also 
be reasons. Fees and performance concerns have recently been cited as reasons 
for exits by large institutional investors from private funds. See David Oakley, 
Investors lose the lovin’ feeling for hedge funds, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/fad8fe2c-3fef-11e4-936b-00144feabdc0 [https://per 
ma.cc/RZA8-FEB5] (noting that CalPERS, the Los Angeles Fire Fighters’ and 
Police Officers’ pensions system, the Louisiana Firefighters’ retirement system, and 
the San Diego Country employees’ retirement system have pulled out of such 
investments). Famed investor Warren Buffett is similarly a critic and is cur-
rently winning a friendly wager with a private fund manager that an S&P 500 
Index fund will outperform a portfolio of private funds over a ten-year period—
2008–2018. See Stephen Foley, Warren Buffett versus the hedge funds, FIN. TIMES 
(May 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/946ade3c-f235-11e4-892a-00144feab7de 
[https://perma.cc/C37Y-9L6A]. 
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the business judgment rule. In short, it is debatable whether courts 
have struck the right balance in evaluating valuation disputes. 
Courts should approach valuation disputes differently. Defer-
ence to the private fund adviser’s valuation should be based on 
the robustness of the adviser’s valuation methodology. A process-
driven approach gives deference to advisers who have developed 
and followed effective valuation procedures while scrutinizing 
those with more vague mandates in the valuation area. Courts 
have several reference points on how to demarcate robust valua-
tion procedures and can draw from private fund industry groups 
as well as requirements for registered investment advisers. Such 
an approach recognizes the difficulty in valuing certain securities 
because it defers to advisers who have made the appropriate ef-
fort to reach an accurate value, while scrutinizing those where the 
potential for abuse is most likely. Courts have fallen short in this 
area in part because the legal infrastructure does not exist. How-
ever, the necessary changes are hardly radical extensions of ex-
isting concepts, such as the general concept that an adviser has a 
fiduciary duty to its client that has been recognized for well over 
fifty years.455 A process-driven approach also avoids the more net-
tlesome questions regarding framing the specific scope of fiduciary 
duties around valuation that are now underway in other areas of law 
involving financial advisers.456 
 
                                                                                                                         
455 SEC v. Cap. Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). 
456 The U.S. Department of Labor has extended its fiduciary rules to pension 
and other advisers. See 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). The new rules have generated a great deal of con-
troversy and have spurred litigation. See Stephen Foley, US makes concessions 
on retirement advice fees, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content 
/89d44a66-fb72-11e5-8f41-df5bda8beb40 [https://perma.cc/T4XR-43CB]; see also 
Chamber of Commerce v. Perez, Case No. 3:16-CV-01476-G, (N.D. Tex., Com-
plaint filed Jun. 1, 2016). 
